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THE SEC AND CLIMATE RISK
(forthcoming, UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy,
2022)
By Lisa Benjamin

ABSTRACT
The time has never been better for the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to regulate climate change disclosures; however, the
agency has a poor track record in mandating climate and other specialized
disclosures from public corporations. Its 2010 guidance on climate-related
disclosures was sparsely enforced. Its 2012 conflict minerals rule was
partially invalidated by the courts, and in 2019 and 2020, the agency failed
to include climate disclosures when modernizing rules and guidelines on
corporate disclosures. These past failures were due to agency inertia, which
was facilitated by a combination of a lack of political feasibility, strong
business resistance to specialized disclosures (despite investor enthusiasm),
and rising judicial hostility to the SEC. These past failures should not dictate
agency approaches to climate disclosures moving forward. Regulating
climate change is high on the agenda of the Biden Administration. Investors
are demanding that public corporations be more transparent about climaterelated risks. The SEC is starting to act, issuing a call for public input on
climate-related disclosures and enhancing its focus on climate-related
disclosure in public company filings.
These political, investor, and agency shifts are primarily due to the rising
awareness of the potential systemic nature of the risks of climate change to
financial systems, both in the U.S. and internationally. This article assesses
the policy feasibility of climate-related disclosure rules. It argues that past
SEC failures can and should inform SEC rulemaking on climate change
disclosures moving forward. Regulating climate disclosures benefits not only
investors and capital markets, but also companies, due to the systemic nature
of climate risk. This article argues that robust cost-benefit analysis and
industry-specific, flexible but firm regulatory approaches will improve policy
feasibility.
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INTRODUCTION
Historically, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has been
unsuccessful at regulating climate-related financial disclosures. A 2017
report by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) found that
despite the wide-spread adoption of sustainability disclosures by companies,
almost half of these disclosures contained boilerplate and vague statements,
and less than one-third of disclosures contained any performance metrics.1 A
2020 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that
while most companies disclosed sustainability information, the metrics used
differed, and so the disclosures were not comparable, clear, or useful for
investors.2 For example, most public companies’ disclosures reviewed by
GAO differed in their reporting of carbon dioxide, disclosing direct (Scope
1), indirect (Scope 2), value chain (Scope 3) and/or reductions in emissions.3
The SEC’s hesitancy to effectively manage climate disclosures stems
from three interrelated factors. The first is lack of political feasibility. Climate
change is one of the most politically sensitive issues in the United States, and,
until recently, mandating climate disclosures by public corporations has
never been a high political priority. While the SEC is an independent agency,
its regulatory reluctance on this issue has persisted through both Republican
and Democratic administrations. The second factor is a clash of voices
between public companies resisting calls for more climate-related disclosure,
and investors, many of whom want increased disclosure from the public
companies they invest in. While investors have repeatedly expressed a strong
desire for clearer and better disclosures, the SEC has not catered to those
1

SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, THE STATE OF DISCLOSURE 14
(2017),
https://www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/StateofDisclosure-Reportweb112717-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC4J-B72D]; see also SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BOARD, CLIMATE RISK TECHNICAL BULLETIN 2021 EDITION 19 (2021),
https://www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Climate-Risk-Technical-Bulletin2021042821.pdf [https://perma.cc/BRF9-NFQZ] (providing more detailed rules around
disclosure in response to the 2017 findings).
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-530, PUBLIC COMPANIES: DISCLOSURE
OF ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE FACTORS AND OPTIONS TO ENHANCE THEM
2

17-18,
32
(2020),
[https://perma.cc/S3MC-R6R4].
3
Id. at 26, 32.

https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-530.pdf
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concerns. Instead, the SEC focused on the entities it directly regulates –
public companies. The agency has acceded to businesses, and industry’s
general resistance to mandated disclosures. Businesses have generally
resisted agency initiatives to impose mandatory environmental, social, and
governance (ESG) disclosures, especially climate disclosures. This resistance
is particularly strong in public corporations that issue securities and are
subject to the SEC’s regulatory regime (“issuers”). Many issuers do not want
to disclose the risks that climate change poses to their business as this may
make investors more reluctant to invest in them and therefore decrease their
share price. Issuers at greater risk of climate impacts have an inherent
incentive to hide or obscure climate-related risks, making regulation
requiring uniform disclosures all the more important. The third and final
factor is rising judicial hostility to the expanded remit of the SEC, and
recently to independent agencies more broadly. These three factors have
contributed to past agency inertia on climate disclosures.
This article explores existing barriers to the SEC in creating a mandatory
climate change disclosure regime. It also identifies opportunities for effective
rulemaking on the issue. It recommends that the SEC issue flexible but firm
rules mandating climate-related disclosures from issuers, which are industry
specific and that also include a robust cost-benefit analysis. While many
barriers have shifted and investor enthusiasm has increased recently, it is
likely that any rule that mandates disclosures will be challenged in the courts.
This article provides recommendations as to how these remaining barriers
can be overcome or mitigated, particularly regarding judicial review. While
a number of authors have addressed SEC action on ESG disclosures,4 this
article focuses exclusively on climate-related disclosures and assesses the
policy feasibility of mandatory rules on climate-related financial disclosures,
as this is the first element of ESG disclosures that the SEC appears willing to
tackle. The costs and benefits of climate-related financial disclosures are also
easier to identify and articulate, making them a reasonable starting point for
the SEC to address. Even if the SEC does not choose this regulatory option,
this article adds to the policy process literature specifically on climate
disclosures, suggesting ways to frame cost-benefit analysis on climate
disclosures.
This article moves the debate forward by focusing on the risks and
benefits of SEC rulemaking in this area, incorporating a selection of
comments (both positive and negative) received by the SEC in the 2021 call
4

See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams & Donna M. Nagy, ESG and Climate Change Blind
Spots: Turning the Corner on SEC Disclosure, 99 TEX. L. REV. 1453 (2021); Virginia Harper
Ho, Modernizing ESG Disclosure, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3845145
[https://perma.cc/LBX4KWTF].
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for public input around climate-related financial disclosures. It identifies the
SEC as the most appropriate agency to regulate climate disclosure, despite its
past failures. It explores unsuccessful attempts over the past decade by the
SEC to regulate climate and social disclosures, including the SEC 2010
guidance on climate-related disclosures, the SEC 2012 rule requiring
disclosure of use of conflict minerals, and the SEC’s modernization of
general corporate disclosures in 2019-2020. It applies lessons from those past
attempts, and proposes recommendations that could mitigate persisting
barriers.
Despite past failures in this area, political and financial approaches to the
risks of climate change have shifted dramatically in the past few years to
varying degrees. Climate change is a major policy priority for the Biden
Administration. Many businesses, particularly institutional investors, express
a strong desire for uniform climate disclosure regulation. Some issuers
(sometimes referred to interchangeably as public corporations in this article)
even express enthusiasm for climate disclosures, although some prefer a
voluntary disclosure regime, and only a few support a mandatory rule.
Generally, however, business resistance to climate-disclosure rulemaking,
and judicial hostility, remain important factors for the SEC to consider.
Despite the risks of rulemaking, this article argues that the time has never
been better for the SEC to use rulemaking to regulate climate change
disclosures.
This is particularly so due to the escalating risks of climate change to
financial actors and systems. Several authors have advocated over the years
for ESG disclosure rules by the SEC.5 This article adds to these calls but
5

Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999); Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability
Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J. 923, 950-51 (2019); Virginia Harper Ho, Disclosure
Overload? Lessons for Risk Disclosure and ESG Reporting Reform from the Regulation S-K
Concept Release, 65 VILL. L. REV. 67 (2020); Virginia Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk
Disclosure and the Costs of Private Ordering, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 407 (2018) (arguing that the
current model of nonfinancial risk disclosure based on the principles of materiality and
leaving investor access to information solely to private ordering mechanisms such as
obtaining information through voluntary reporting and private standard setting organizations
is ineffective, costly to investors, issuers and regulators, and undermines the mission of the
SEC); Hana V. Vizcarra, ENTERING A NEW ERA IN CLIMATE-RELATED DISCLOSURES AND
FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE U.S. (2021), http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wpcontent/uploads/Vizcarra-ALI2021-ClimateFinanceRiskOutlook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BJ8U-FC42]; Madison Condon, Market Myopia’s Climate Bubble UTAH
L.
REV.
1
(forthcoming
2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3782675
[https://perma.cc/W8NAJJA5]; Daniel C. Esty & Quentin Karpilow, Harnessing Investor Interest in Sustainability:
The Next Frontier in Environmental Information Regulation, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 625 (2019)
(suggesting a mandatory environmental, social and governance (ESG) reporting
requirement); Melissa K. Scanlan, Climate Risk is Investment Risk, 36 J. ENV’T. L. & LITIG.
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highlights some of the internal failings by the SEC over the years, as well as
some of the pitfalls facing the agency as a result of past agency failures and
recent judicial decisions, and then provides some recommendations. These
recommendations may improve the odds of successful regulatory efforts
going forward for climate-related financial disclosures.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I establishes a taxonomy of shifting
political, business, and judicial landscapes on climate risk regulation.
Political and investor shifts are due in large part to increased concern about
the financial risks of climate change. Part II charts agency inertia of the SEC
on specialized disclosures. It fleshes out examples of the hurdles and agency
approaches identified in Part I that have contributed to agency inertia. The
2010 SEC guidance on climate change was rarely enforced by the agency.
The 2012 conflict minerals rule and the agency’s 2020 proposal regarding
Regulation S-K disclosures demonstrate persistent business resistance and
judicial hostility, including the Supreme Court’s recent decision in AFPF v
Bonta which demonstrates increasing judicial hostility towards disclosure
regimes.6 Part III advocates for SEC regulatory action despite the risks
identified in Part II. This section focuses on the systemic character of climate
risks, and the important role that the SEC plays as a regulatory bulwark
against future escalation of climate change to a systemic financial risk. It also
analyzes a selection of public responses to the recent SEC call for comments
on climate disclosures in 2021, illustrating investor enthusiasm but also
continuing business resistance. Part IV weighs the risk and benefits of a rule
mandating climate-related disclosures, and it also suggests some strategies
and recommendations that may prove useful to navigating these barriers and
harnessing rising political and investor enthusiasm for regulating climaterelated disclosures while also mitigating countervailing issuer and judicial
hostility. It advocates for robust cost-benefit analysis, a flexible yet firm
regulatory approach that incorporates industry specific rules, and is in
keeping with existing international standards, thereby increasing policy
feasibility.
I. SHIFTING POLITICAL, INVESTOR, BUSINESS AND JUDICIAL LANDSCAPES
Climate-related disclosures by public corporations did not receive much
political attention in the U.S. until the Biden Administration. During the
previous Democratic and Republican administrations, the issue was never a
political priority. This is partly related to investors and financial regulators’
lack of focus on the financial-related risks of climate change. The escalating
financial risks of climate change have affected political approaches to the
1 (2021).
6
Americans For Prosperity Foundation v Bonta, 594 U.S. ___ (2021).
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issue, with the Biden Administration closely tracking scientific and investor
approaches to climate disclosures.
A. Shifting political landscapes
The election of President Obama in 2008 marked a significant shift in U.S.
climate policy. Before taking office, then President-elect Obama declared to
a group of U.S. governors that his presidency would “mark a new chapter in
America’s leadership on climate change that will strengthen our security and
create millions of new jobs in the process.”7 When he took office, however,
climate change ultimately took a back seat to President Obama’s key
priorities of managing the fallout from the 2008 financial crisis and
healthcare reform.8 Eight years later, President Obama’s climate legacy is
hotly contested. Critics point to his failure to enact cap-and-trade legislation
and the granting of permits to drill for oil in the Arctic, while supporters
celebrate the success of the 2015 Paris Agreement and the range of
regulations passed by the EPA and other federal agencies.9
When it came to the SEC and other financial regulatory agencies, the
focus of the Obama Administration was squarely on addressing regulatory
gaps and oversight issues to repair the damage to the U.S. economy and
financial system from the 2008 financial crisis.10 The SEC’s 2010 interpretive
guidance on climate change disclosure was prompted not by the White
House, but instead by a rulemaking petition filed in 2007 by investor groups,
NGOs, and senior government officials from California, New York,
Vermont, and nine other states.11 President Obama did not publicly announce
his support for or offer any opinions on this issue. Nevertheless, the SEC’s
vote in favor of the petition was led by its new Chair, Mary Schapiro, whom
President Obama appointed on his first day in office—January 20, 2009.
7
John M. Broder, Obama Affirms Climate Change Goals N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/us/politics/19climate.html [https://perma.cc/9DTXKAVN].
8
Cass R. Sunstein, Changing Climate Change, 2009-2016, 42 HARV. ENV’T. L. REV.
231, 245 (2018).
9
See Christopher J. Bailey, Assessing Obama’s Climate Change Record, 28 ENV’T POL.
847, 847-48 (2019); David Bookbinder, The Obama Climate Legacy, NISKANEN CTR. (Apr.
11,
2017),
https://www.niskanencenter.org/greenwashing-obama-climate-legacy/
[https://perma.cc/C8SV-SXCX].
10
Remarks on Financial Regulatory Reform, 1 PUB. PAPERS 843 (June 17, 2009),
available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-2009-book1/pdf/PPP-2009-book1doc-pg843-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XW3-H6MC].
11
Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk Disclosure, California Public
Employees' Retirement System, et al., Petition for Rulemaking, (Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Sept.
18,
2007),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2007/petn4-547.pdf,
[https://perma.cc/7UPB-P2MX].
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In 2017, almost immediately after taking office, President Trump
submitted a notice to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement
and started to unwind domestic regulation and policies on climate change.
Many of these policies had been pursued via Executive Action under the
Obama Administration and so were easily undone by the incoming
Administration.12 The U.S. departure from the Paris Agreement had a
negative effect on international efforts to mandate climate-related disclosures
within the Group of 20 or G-20 (an intergovernmental forum of finance
ministers and central bank governors from the world’s largest economies).13
President Trump appointed Jay Clayton as Chair of the SEC in 2017 as part
of the Administration’s deregulatory agenda for financial firms and
markets.14 In his statement announcing the nomination of Clayton, President
Trump expressed a desire to undo the many regulations that he believed
stifled investment in American businesses.15 During Clayton’s tenure, the
SEC did not issue any new rules on climate-related disclosures, and, in fact,
issued a number of regulations which restricted shareholder voting, and
which limited investors’ ability to request climate risk disclosures.16
See Chris Wold, Climate Change, Presidential Power, and Leadership: “We Can’t
Wait,” 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 303, 304–07 (2012) (noting that even though the Obama
Administration demonstrated some progressive action on climate change, the issue was not
pursued with sufficient urgency and the action that was taken was done primarily through
executive action which is vulnerable to changing administrations).
13
Ciara Linnane, Trump Administration Stymies Push for Improved Climate-Risk
Disclosure Among Companies, MARKETWATCH (Jul. 31, 2017, 3:26 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/trump-administration-stymies-push-for-better-climaterisk-disclosure-2017-07-24 [https://perma.cc/8B99-UW2R].
14
Brian V. Breheny, et al, Trump’s Focus on Deregulation Could Shape SEC Priorities
in 2017, SKADDEN (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2017/01/
trumps-focus-on-deregulation-could-shape-sec-prior
[https://perma.cc/E4MP-7KSS];
Marcy Gordon, SEC Chair Clayton Leaving Post as Top Financial Regulator, AP NEWS
(Nov. 16, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-donald-trump-financial-markets-jayclayton-financial-crisis-6ae5762ae1edd38cc34f4857934751e2 [ https://perma.cc/A2AP8ANV].
15
Renee Merle, Trump to Tap Wall Street Lawyer Jay Clayton to Head SEC, WASH.
POST
(Jan.
4,
2017,
11:40 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/01/04/trump-to-tap-wall-streetlawyer-jay-clayton-to-head-sec/ [https://perma.cc/HCU5-SXUB].
16
See e..g. Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Amendment to Modernize
Shareholder Proposed Rule (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020220 [https://perma.cc/238X-J5VJ] (among other things, raising the threshold amount and
duration of ownership of shareholding for shareholder proposals to be included in proxy
statements); Public Statement of Sec. Exch. Comm’n Commissioner Robert J. Jackson Jr.,
Statement on Proposals to Restrict Shareholder Voting (Nov. 5, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-jackson-2019-11-05-open-meeting
[https://perma.cc/3XRY-L3Z7] (critiquing the amendment as reducing the accountability of
CEOs and corporate management to investors).
12
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The political landscape on climate change shifted dramatically with
the Biden Administration. Climate change has been high on President
Biden’s agenda since the early days of his Presidential campaign in 2019,
when he announced an ambitious plan to address climate change and
environmental justice. The President’s goal is to “ensure the U.S. achieves a
100% clean energy economy and reaches net-zero emissions no later than
2050”.17 On his first day in office, President Biden both re-joined the Paris
Agreement and signed Executive Order 13990, which directed agencies to
immediately commence work to confront the climate crisis.18 One week later,
President Biden signed Executive Order 14008, which incorporated the goal
to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, originally laid out in President
Biden’s campaign, and set out a whole-of-government approach to climate
change policy.19 It also established a federal government policy to “drive
assessment, disclosure, and mitigation of climate pollution and climaterelated risks in every sector of our economy.”20
Executive Order 14008 also mandated action by financial regulators.
It called for the preparation of a Climate Finance Plan focusing on
international climate finance.21 The final version of this plan was published
on April 22, 2021.22 It called for a large-scale increase in international climate
finance, noted that the U.S. Treasury will work with U.S. regulators to
support and guide the International Financial Reporting Standards
Foundation, the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSC), and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) towards shaping consistent,
comparable and reliable climate-related financial disclosures including
through recommendations and international standards.23 Finally, Executive
Order 14008 directed the Secretary of the Treasury to participate in
international fora and institutions working on managing climate-related

17
Valerie Volcovici, Biden Unveils $1.7 Trillian Climate Plan to End U.S. Carbon
Emissions by 2050 REUTERS (June 4, 2019) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-electionbiden-climate/biden-unveils-1-7-trillion-climate-plan-to-end-u-s-carbon-emissions-by2050-idUSKCN1T515R [https://perma.cc/584F-K97W].
18

Exec. Order No. 13990, Protecting Public Health and the Environment and
Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037 (Jan. 20, 2021).
19
Exec. Order No. 14008, Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad, 86 Fed.
Reg. 7619, 7622 (Jan. 27, 2021).
20
Id.
21
Id. at 7620.
22
THE WHITE HOUSE, U.S. INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE FINANCE PLAN 12 (Apr. 22,
2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/U.S.-InternationalClimate-Finance-Plan-4.22.21-Updated-Spacing.pdf [https://perma.cc/47J8-UGAP].
23
Id. at 12.
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risks.24 This international collaboration is important, as the U.S. has fallen
behind its allies on the issue of climate-related disclosures.
On May 20, 2021, President Biden signed an executive order
addressing climate-related financial risk, declaring it the policy of his
Administration to advance “consistent, clear, intelligible, comparable, and
accurate disclosure of climate-related financial risk”.25 In setting out the new
policy, Executive Order 14030 comments that the failure of financial
institutions to appropriately and adequately account for and measure climaterelated financial risks threatens the competitiveness of U.S. companies and
markets, the life savings and pensions of U.S. workers and families, and the
ability of U.S. financial institutions to serve communities.26 The Order
specifically includes the enhancement of climate-related disclosures by
regulated entities, supporting the SEC’s recent call for comments on whether
corporate disclosure rules should be expanded to explicitly address climaterelated risks.27
As an independent agency, the SEC is not directly subject to Executive
Orders except to the extent permitted by law, and so despite this high level of
activity at the executive level, there has been no change in regulatory
requirements on climate disclosures at the SEC as of yet. There is no federal
regulation that explicitly mandates disclosure on climate-related risks by
public corporations. Instead, public corporations (issuers) disclose climaterelated risks if they consider them to be material to their business. The current
policy gap in the U.S. on climate disclosures is not mirrored abroad,
particularly in the EU, where disclosure of ESG indicators, including those
related to climate, is becoming a regulatory requirement.28 Other jurisdictions
24

Exec. Order No. 14008, 86 Fed. Reg. at 7620. The Treasury Secretary Chairs the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), which includes the Chair of the SEC, and can
call for agency rulemaking in specific areas as part of the FSOC’s mandate to constrain
excessive risk in the financial system.
25
Exec. Order No. 14030, Climate-Related Financial Risk, 86 Fed. Reg. 27967, 27967
(May 20, 2021).
26
Id.
27
Id. at 27968; Madeleine Boyer & Stacey Sublett Halliday, President Biden Issues
Federal Direction on Disclosure of Climate-Related Financial Risk, NAT’L L. REV. (May
25, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/president-biden-issues-federal-directiondisclosure-climate-related-financial-risk?amp [https://perma.cc/P6WV-VP8K].
28
For example, in 2017, the High-Level Expert Group on Sustainable Finance issued
their key recommendations to clarify investor duties and extend associated time horizons of
investments, and to bring greater focus to ESG factors. The Action Plan outlines ten reforms
in three key areas, and is geared towards reorienting private capital to more sustainable
investments. It also aims to manage financial risks stemming from climate change, resource
depletion, environmental degradation and social issues. One of these key areas is
Mainstreaming Sustainability into Risk Management, and includes the recommendation to
clarify institutional investors’ and asset managers’ duties, and to reduce the pressure for

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3952915

8-Mar-22]

THE SEC AND CLIMATE RISK

11

have moved ahead with mandating climate disclosures, and so with no
uniform disclosure regulations, the U.S. is out of step with its major
counterparts in other leading capital markets.29 Policy gaps are not costless.
Lack of uniform risk disclosure around climate change could lead to
increasing climate litigation.30 Policy gaps could also lead to unilateral and
uneven investor responses to climate litigation and climate-related risks more
broadly.

B. Rising investor concern
Since the conclusion of the Paris Agreement in 2015, investors have paid
more attention to the financial risks of climate change. These concerns have
only escalated as the physical and transitional risks of climate change have
increased. Scientific reports, which continue to warn of impending
catastrophic climate-impacts, have been absorbed by many in the financial
sector, particularly institutional investors. The recent 2021 IPCC report
expresses clear alarm around the potential impacts of climate change, and the

short-term performance by increased transparency. See, Action Plan: Financing Sustainable
Growth, COM (2018) 97 final (Aug. 3, 2018). The EU 10-point Action Plan for sustainable
finance was followed by three key pieces of legislation to promote private sector investment
in sustainable development. These include a Unified EU Green Classification System or
“Taxonomy”, legislation requiring that corporations and investors disclose to their clients
the impact of sustainability (ESG factors) on financial returns and the impact of their
investment decision on sustainability (applicable from March 2021), and finally Climate
Benchmarks and Benchmarks’ ESG Disclosures (creating a new category of low-carbon
benchmarks, which provides investors with better information on the carbon footprint of
their investments).
29
See Virginia Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure and the Costs of Private
Ordering, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 407, 424 (2018).
30
There has been significant scholarly work on climate litigation around the globe, see,
e.g., David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts:
A New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15 (2012); U.N. Env’t
Programme, The Status of Climate Change Litigation: A Global Review (2017),
http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/files/2017/05/Burger-Gundlach-2017-05-UN-Envt-CCLitigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/BNT5-JPLH]; R. Henry Weaver & Douglas A. Kysar,
Courting Disaster: Climate Change and the Adjudication of Catastrophe, 93 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 295 (2017); Michael C. Blumm & Mary Cristina Wood, “No Ordinary Lawsuit”:
Climate Change, Due Process and The Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (2017);
JACQUELINE PEEL & HARI M. OSOFSKY, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: REGULATORY
PATHWAYS TO CLEANER ENERGY (2015); Lisa Benjamin, The Road to Paris Runs Through
Delaware: Climate Litigation and Directors’ Duties, 2020(2) UTAH L. REV. 313 (2020)
(noting an earlier “first wave” of climate litigation in the United States against corporations
floundered and failed, but noting a second wave of corporate climate litigation, even if not
successful in courts, could implicate directors’ duties).
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increasingly narrow window available to mitigate its most severe impacts.31
Some institutional investors are unilaterally requiring climate information
and climate action from the corporations they invest in.
Financial-related concerns over climate change became an international
priority with the September 2015 speech by Mark Carney, the then Governor
of the Bank of England, to insurers at Lloyds of London.32 Dubbed an
“unlikely climate champion” as a former Goldman Sachs banker,33 Carney
highlighted the enormous risks that climate change posed to UK investors.
Carney’s speech was couched in the language of risk, and set out the broad
and systemic risks that climate change poses to financial systems and
financial stability, as well as the critical role that financial policy makers have
in addressing these systemic risks.34 The timing and location of his speech
were as important as its contents. His speech preceded the conclusion of the
Paris Agreement on Climate Change in December 2015 and ushered in the
formation by the Financial Stability Board of the G20 of the Task Force on
Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) in 2015.35 As a member of the
FSB, the SEC contributed to the formation of the TCFD guidance, and so is
familiar with its requirements. The TCFD guidance on climate-related
disclosures has quickly become the international standard for public
corporations around the world, supported by thousands of asset owners,
central banks, financial regulators, and institutional investors.36 One of those
supporters is BlackRock, which issued significant statements in the past two
years regarding its shifting expectations on climate disclosures from the
31

INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers, in
CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 1, 5, 10 (Valérie Masson-Delmotte
et
al.
eds.,
2021),
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_SPM.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9X8K-7YBZ] (“It is unequivocal that human influence has warmed the
atmosphere, ocean and land.” and “It is virtually certain that hot extremes (including
heatwaves) have become more frequent and more intense across most land regions since the
1950s.”).
32
Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Eng. & Chairman of the Fin. Stability Bd.,
Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon – Climate Change and Financial Stability, Speech
Given
at
Lloyd’s
of
London,
at
11,
(Sept.
29,
2015),
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2015/breaking-the-tragedy-of-the-horizonclimate-change-and-financial-stability [https://perma.cc/H5VS-5NRV].
33
Ed King, Mark Carney, the Unlikely Climate Champion, CLIMATE HOME NEWS (Dec.
15, 2016, 4:53pm) https://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/12/15/mark-carney-theunlikely-climate-champion [https://perma.cc/V6GN-FVA8].
34
LISA BENJAMIN, COMPANIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE: THEORY AND LAW IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM 173-174 (2021).
35
Id. at 173.
36
Support the TCFD, TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED DISCLOSURES,
https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/support-tcfd [https://perma.cc/L9TP-5JMG] (last visited Oct. 24,
2021).
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corporations it invests in.
BlackRock is the world’s largest asset management firm, and one of the
“big three” indexed funds in the United States. In January 2020, BlackRock
released its annual letter to CEOs from Larry Fink, as well as a letter from
BlackRock’s Executive Committee to BlackRock’s clients. Both letters
centered on the risks of climate change. In his letter to CEOs, Larry Fink
noted that climate change has become a defining factor in companies’ longterm prospects.37 Fink also noted that climate risk is compelling investors to
reassess core assumptions about modern finance. While markets have been
slow to reflect climate risk, he believes that a fundamental reshaping of
finance is about to occur. Citing reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, Fink stated that the risks of climate change are now
investment risks, and that climate risks are driving a profound reassessment
of capital allocation. The letter states that every government, company, and
shareholder must confront climate change.
A significant section of the 2020 letter emphasizes the need for improved
climate disclosure for shareholders, particularly the need for a widespread
and standardized approach to reporting. In order to make sustainability the
new standard for investing, BlackRock identified three major issues that must
be addressed: the need for a common framework on environmental, social,
and governance investing, transparent data, and objective metrics that can
empower asset owner choice.38 In assessing international jurisdictional
approaches, the BlackRock policy note highlights that the U.S. stands apart
from other jurisdictions by not having prescribed regulations on ESG
disclosures. Instead, the U.S. relies on the SEC principles-based materiality
threshold.39 The BlackRock policy states that different jurisdictional
approaches can cause confusion, and a cohesive and better-aligned set of
standards would be useful to investors.40
The 2020 BlackRock letter to CEOs was prescriptive about climate
disclosures. It asked companies that BlackRock invests in to publish
disclosures in line with the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board
standards and disclose climate risks in line with the TCFD guidance. In
particular, the letter asked companies to disclose their plans for operating
Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, BlackRock, Larry Fink’s
2020 Letter to CEOs: A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance (2020),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2020-larry-fink-ceo-letter
[https://perma.cc/4T5J-34L9].
38
BARBARA NOVICK ET AL., TOWARDS A COMMON LANGUAGE FOR SUSTAINABLE
INVESTING,
BLACKROCK
PUBLIC
POLICY
3
(Jan.
2020),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-towards-a-commonlanguage-for-sustainable-investing-january-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/W35N-7PH2].
39
Id. at 5.
40
Id. at 6.
37
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under a scenario where the parties to the Paris Agreement reach the treaty’s
goal of limiting global warming to well below two degrees, as expressed by
the TCFD guidelines. If a company fails to make robust disclosures,
BlackRock will assume that companies are not adequately managing climate
risk. BlackRock also believes that directors should be held accountable for
lack of appropriate disclosures, and it stated its intention to vote against the
management and directors of companies that are not making sufficient
progress on sustainability-related disclosures. In the absence of federal
regulations, BlackRock decided to take action and impose its own disclosure
requirements voluntarily, announced through this letter in 2020. In his 2022
letter, Fink stressed the financial benefits of ESG investing and stakeholder
capitalism.41
BlackRock was a founding member of the TCFD, and the same month as
the letter was issued to CEOs, BlackRock joined Climate Action 100+, an
investor-led coalition designed to pressure the largest polluting companies to
reduce their emissions. Of course, there is no certainty regarding whether or
how BlackRock will implement these approaches, and BlackRock had been
criticized for not acting more aggressively and supporting climate-related
shareholder proposals.42 In addition, there are valid concerns regarding
investors unilaterally taking up the mantel of regulators in this way.43
In May 2021, BlackRock supported a startling move by activist hedge
fund investor Engine No. 1 to replace several ExxonMobil directors with
Engine No. 1’s candidates.44 On May 26, 2021, Engine No. 1’s nominees
were elected by ExxonMobil shareholders, who were dissatisfied with
disappointing financial returns, the corporation’s lack of action on climate
change, and the lack of disclosure over climate-related risks facing the firm.45
Engine No. 1 also urged the corporation to pledge to reduce its emissions to
net-zero by 2050, warning that this was “not just a climate issue but a
Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, BlackRock, Larry Fink’s
Letter
to
CEOs:
The
Power
of
Capitalism
(2022),
HTTPS://WWW.BLACKROCK.COM/CORPORATE/INVESTOR-RELATIONS/LARRY-FINK-CEOLETTER.
42
Attracta Mooney, BlackRock Accused of Climate Change Hypocrisy, FIN. TIMES (May
17,
2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/0e489444-2783-4f6e-a006-aa8126d2ff46
[https://perma.cc/655K-REDV].
43
Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2020).
44
Svea Herbst-Bayliss, BlackRock Backs 3 Dissidents to Shake up Exxon Board –
Sources,
REUTERS
(May
25,
2021,
12:36 PM)
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/exclusive-blackrock-backs-three-directornominees-challenging-exxons-board-2021-05-25/ [https://perma.cc/3NZV-6VBY].
45
Steven Mufson, The Fight for the Soul – and the Future – of ExxonMobil, WASH.
POST
(May
22,
2021,
4:00 AM)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/climateenvironment/2021/05/21/exxon-faces-shareholder-revolt-over-climate-change/
[https://perma.cc/B5H5-P7HM].
41

2022
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fundamental investor issue—no different than capital allocation or
management compensation—given the immense risk to ExxonMobil’s
current business model in a rapidly changing world.”46 A similar call to
action—framed as a non-binding shareholder proposal—won the support of
the majority of investors in Chevron on May 26, 2021 as well.47 While the
Chevron proposal does not include an emissions reduction target, it illustrates
investors’ growing frustration regarding the lack of climate action by these
public corporations. It also illustrates rising investor concern about the lack
of disclosure by these firms in light of the significant risks climate change
poses to their businesses. These recent events are part of a long line of
investor-led initiatives on climate change, illustrating mounting concern by
investors over the financial impacts of climate change. Investors are
clamoring for more and better information by issuers on climate-related risks,
but not all issuers are enthusiastic about making these disclosures.
C. Business Resistance
Despite the high levels of risk involved, requiring disclosure of climaterelated risks from public corporations remains a challenging regulatory issue.
Public corporations systematically underreport the risks that climate change
poses to their businesses. This resistance stems from two factors. The first is
that assessing the risks of climate change to any particular business is
complex. Climate change is a classic collective action problem, and a “super
wicked” policy problem.48 Climate science is complex and involves elements
of risk, probability, and uncertainty. There are uncertain temporal delays
between emissions and their effects. Climate science relies on models that
anticipate various societal and political trajectories, and there is always some
uncertainty on the potential severity of impacts.
The second factor is that disclosure of climate risks could harm
investment opportunities in the businesses that disclose these risks. Certain
issuers are extremely vulnerable to climate-related risks, and so they may not
want to disclose these risks to investors. Firm managers are incentivized not
to disclose negative information that may reduce share prices and their
executive compensation. They may overemphasize, and potentially
greenwash, their positive climate activities but underemphasize the risks

46

Id.
Chevron Investors Back Proposal for more Emissions Cuts, REUTERS (May 26, 2021,
11:44 AM)
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chevron-shareholders-approveproposal-cut-customer-emissions-2021-05-26 [https://perma.cc/RT22-L4HX].
48
Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1159 (2009).
47

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3952915

16

THE SEC AND CLIMATE RISK

[8-Mar-22

posed to their businesses from climate change.49 Business resistance to
disclosure is compounded by agency reluctance to regulate climate
disclosures.
The SEC’s approach to climate disclosures shifted with the most recent
change in administration. In early 2021, the SEC solicited comments on its
existing policies on climate-related disclosures.50 The agency also announced
its intention to enhance monitoring and enforcement of climate-related risks
and created a Climate and ESG Task Force in the Division of Enforcement
of the SEC.51 Prior to this recent activity, the agency had been slow to react
to investor concerns highlighted above. This is in part due to continuous
business resistance to mandatory disclosure requirements.
Responses and comments from industry actors to any proposed climate
disclosure rulemaking are important. While many businesses, such as
Amazon52 and Shell,53 have announced net-zero emission reduction targets,
the willingness of these same businesses to disclose the risks that climate
change poses to them remains questionable. What corporations say matters,54
but what they do matters even more. Not all market actors will be on board.
Some businesses support voluntary disclosures, others prefer the existing
materiality thresholds, and some support mandatory disclosure regimes.
Moving forward, it will be important to not only require the disclosure of
climate-related risks by corporations, but also to monitor and penalize false
and misleading statements by corporations on climate action. The SEC
Kevin Crowley, Chevron ‘Greenwashing’ Targeted in Complaint Filed with FTC,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 16, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/202103-16/chevron-greenwashing-targeted-in-complaint-filed-with-u-s-ftc
[https://perma.cc/Q6B3-9PFH]; see also Harper Ho, supra note 5, at 441 (citing from
behavioral literature that overconfidence, optimism, and hubris sway managers to dismiss
potential risks); Benjamin et al., ‘Climate-Washing Litigation: Legal Liability for Misleading
Climate Communications’ (2022) Climate Social Science Network.
50
Press Release, Allison Herren Lee, Acting Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., Public
Input
Welcomed
on
Climate
Change
Disclosures
(Mar.
15,
2021),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-climate-change-disclosures
[https://perma.cc/9UAM-86HY].
51
Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Enforcement Task Force Focused on Climate
and ESG Issues (Mar. 4, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-42
[https://perma.cc/6W27-Q2LY].
52
See,
e.g.,
Amazon
Sustainability,
ABOUT
AMAZON
https://sustainability.aboutamazon.com [https://perma.cc/WCH8-79ZM] (last visited Oct.
25, 2021) (announcing a net-zero carbon target by 2040 and powering the entire business
with renewable energy by 2025).
53
See, e.g.,, Our Climate Target, Shell (last visited Oct. 25, 2021)
https://www.shell.com/energy-and-innovation/the-energy-future/our-climate-target.html
[https://perma.cc/C82U-TBLJ] (announcing a net-zero emissions target by 2050).
54
See generally Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of
Stakeholder Rhetoric on Corporate Norms, 31 J. CORP. L. 675 (2006).
49
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should play a role in regulating corporate statements on climate risks where
those statements may injure investors.
Issuers are economically and politically influential. Large market actors
may exert influence not only over the executive branch, but also over
independent agencies through the comments they submit to agency
regulatory proposals or through litigation contesting the remit of any
rulemaking promulgated by the SEC. In fact, the SEC and its independent
agency status have been the subject of high-profile cases at both the D.C.
Circuit (brought by trade associations closely linked to fossil-fuel-intensive
firms),55 and, most recently, at the Supreme Court.56 Thus, corporate and
judicial hostility to agency action remain potential obstacles going forward
for the SEC in any climate-related disclosure efforts.
Despite potential obstacles, regulating climate risks is important, and
standardized disclosure requirements can be useful for corporations and the
general investing public.57 Assessing agency prospects for success in this area
provides an important piece of the climate solutions puzzle. The absence of
uniform agency regulation and lack of enforcement by the SEC means that
corporations often publish vague, boilerplate statements about climate
change and climate risk. These disclosures provide little to no useful
information to investors about the levels of risks that climate change may
pose to the businesses they invest in. This means investors cannot make clear,
informed choices that avoid or at least mitigate some of the most catastrophic
impacts of climate change. Regulation is designed to cure or remediate
information assymetries in markets, and climate-related disclosure is a classic
example of information assymetries that harm the investing public. Investors
should be fully informed of the risks facing the companies they invest in. This
is particularly the case with systemic risks such as climate change, which can
damage the integrity of capital markets as a whole. The existing regulatory
gap also means capital can be misallocated, delaying the transition away from
fossil fuels, and intensifying and worsening the impacts of climate change.
Escalating climate risks are bad for investors, capital markets, and issuers.
Well regulated markets, conversely, provide benefits to all market
participants, and the public. In the ten years since the publication of the
original SEC guidance on climate-related disclosures, the risks of climate
change have only escalated in the U.S. and around the world, and so this
regulatory void is not costless. The SEC has a variety of regulatory tools
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. S.EC. (NAM III), 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010); Seila
Law, LLC v. Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
57
See Vizcarra, supra note 5, at 2 (noting that in the absence of federal regulatory
mandates requiring line-item climate-related disclosures have led to a plethora of private
standards that are confusing and lead to investor dissatisfaction).
55
56

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3952915

18

THE SEC AND CLIMATE RISK

[8-Mar-22

available to it to address climate disclosures. It could enforce the existing
2010 guidance, issue updated guidance, and/or promulgate a new rule
requiring climate disclosures; however, regulatory action—such as
rulemaking—may encounter resistance from issuers, and so agency action on
climate disclosures is likely to be subject to judicial review.58 As a result,
recent pronouncements by the Supreme Court on the status of independent
agencies are relevant to any SEC action on climate-related disclosures.

D. Judicial Hostility
For many years, courts deferred to the expertise and independent status
of the SEC, and so the agency enjoyed a significant amount of deference in
its rulemaking and prosecutorial initiatives.59 This level of respect was
bolstered by judicial deference constructs such as Chevron and Auer
deference.60 Judicial pushback to the administrative state generally, and to
the SEC specifically, began in the 1980s.61 This pushback was illustrated
through a series of cases at the D.C. Circuit, and also more recent Supreme
Court cases, questioning the legitimacy of independent agencies. Decreased
deference to the SEC is attributed to increased politicization of the courts and
the expanded regulatory remit of the SEC, primarily through the Dodd-Frank
Act.62 These cases, combined with changing judicial attitudes to deference
owed to agencies more broadly, increase the risks of rulemaking for the SEC
on climate disclosures.
The SEC reflects some of the usual hallmarks of an independent agency.
It was established during the New Deal era, and it was structured in order to
58

Maintaining the status quo and leaving disclosures to private ordering would allow
regulated entities to decide whether climate change is a material risk to their businesses using
a principles-based approach, rather than a more prescriptive line-item disclosure basis, but
see Margaret E. Peloso, An Approach for Investors, Companies, 37 ENV’T. F. 27, 27 (2020)
(recommending a focus on firm resilience instead by investors and the corporations they
invest in) and Michael P. Vandenbergh, Disclosure of Private Environmental Governance
Risks, WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), (identifying the risks that the proliferation
of private environmental governance and climate initiatives pose in disclosure regimes which
do not require their disclosure).
59
Roberta S. Karmel, Little Power Struggles Everywhere: Attacks on the Administrative
State at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 72 ADMIN. L. REV. 207, 209 (2020); see
also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (where the Court provided significant
deference to the SEC to decide whether it would use rulemaking or adjudication).
60
Karmel, supra note 55, at 209-10 ( Chevron deference has traditionally been applied
by courts to agency interpretation of statutory provisions, and Auer deference to agency
interpretation of regulations.
61
Id. at 210.
62
Id. at 231.
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ensure agency expertise and insulation from presidential control. The original
goal of many of the structural features of these early independent agencies
was to ensure expert, impartial decision making.63 The SEC was established
with a multimember Commission with partisan balance. The Chair is
appointed by the President, the agency has broad litigation authority, and its
five Commissioners enjoy implicit protection from removal.64 Despite its
assumed independence, the agency has been involved in a number of highprofile cases regarding the status of independent agencies at the Supreme
Court. While they did not undermine the SEC’s independent status directly,
these cases illustrate rising judicial hostility to independent agencies more
broadly.
The SEC’s enabling statute, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,65 omits
one of the key hallmarks of an independent agency: explicit for-cause
removal protection. Nevertheless, the SEC has long been considered by
legislators, courts, and legal scholars to be an independent agency whose
commissioners enjoy implied removal protection.66 Two decisions of the
Supreme Court placed this assumption in some doubt, with the majority in
each case taking a limited approach to Congress’s ability to restrict the
President’s removal power and casting doubt on whether a for-cause removal
protection should be recognized absent express statutory language.
In Free Enterprise Fund,67 the Court held unconstitutional and
severed explicit for-cause removal provisions protecting the removal of
members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), an
administrative body created to oversee regulation of accounting practices
related to securities markets. The Court described this structure as “dual forcause limitations,” contrary to the vesting of executive power in the President
under Article II of the Constitution and in contravention of the Constitution’s
separation of powers.68
Although the very finding of “dual for-cause limitations” in Free
Enterprise Fund suggests the Court accepted the independence of the SEC,
63

See Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and
Executive Agencies) 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 772 (2013).
64
Id. at 772, 819-20 (identifying several indicia of independent agencies but refuting
any hard, binary division of agencies into independent and executive, illustrating many
agencies enjoy a spectrum of these indicia. The authors also note that Chairs of independent
agencies will often align the agenda of the agency with that of the administration for a
number of reasons, being reappointment, access to political rewards, placement in higher
level positions, so the appointment of the Chair by the President can be a very effective tool
of control).
65
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.
66
The SEC is not an Independent Agency, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 781.
67
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
68
Id. at 492.
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some commentators argue that this issue was not squarely raised and thus
remains unsettled.69 In his dissent, Justice Breyer took issue with this
assumption of independence, noting that it is “certainly not obvious that the
SEC Commissioners enjoy ‘for cause’ protection,” suggesting that taking
away the power of removal should require “very clear and explicit language”
and not “mere inference or implication.”70
A decade later in Seila Law,71 the Supreme Court again considered
the validity of a for-cause removal provision concerning an administrative
body, the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (CFPB). The majority of the
Court found this agency structure “lacks a foundation in historical practice
and clashes with constitutional structure by concentrating power in a
unilateral actor insulated from Presidential control,” thereby violating the
separation of powers.72 The decision in Seila Law signals growing judicial
hostility to the independent status of agencies such as the SEC, although there
were many statements in the judgment that implicitly assumed the
independence of the SEC. While the court showed great skepticism toward
independent agencies generally, if an agency is a multimember one and does
not wield significant executive power, it is probably safe, for now, from the
judicial scrutiny evidenced towards the PCAOB and CFPB.73
Financial agencies are often granted more independence by Congress
than normal executive agencies, in order to allow them to make prudent
decisions in the short-term that may be necessary but politically unpopular.
Political insulation also allows financial regulatory agencies to avoid capture
by influential market actors, and so enables them to protect vulnerable
segments of the population.74
The independent agency status of the SEC is particularly important in the
context of climate-related disclosures. The goal of political insulation for
independent agencies also serves a broader social utility function—it enables
the agency to protect the public, particularly vulnerable segments of the
public, by avoiding or minimizing regulatory capture.75 This is particularly
relevant where agencies are dealing with collective action problems where
69

The SEC Is Not An Independent Agency, supra note 62, at 781-82.
See Free Enter. Fund., 561 U.S. at 546.
71
Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
72
Id. at 2192.
73
Cass R. Sustein & Adrian Vermule, Presidential Review: The President’s Statutory
Authority Over Independent Agencies, 109 GEO. L. J. 637, 639 (2021).
74
Karmel, supra note 55, at 211-12.
75
Rachel Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design,
89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 17 (2010); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The
Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599 (2010) (arguing that while
independent agencies have long been dominant in financial policy, in fact political oversight
and hybrid regulatory relationships with other agencies dilute this binary definition).
70
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the public is often out-resourced in the political process by well-financed and
politically influential special interests.76 Financial institutions in particular
should strive for long-term financial stability and economic growth, which
may require unpopular short-term action.77 Independent agencies such as the
SEC may be better able to calculate and cater for low-probability but highrisk catastrophic events that may materialize as a result of climate change.78
Rising judicial hostility also contributed to agency inertia on rulemaking in
general, and in particular on climate and social disclosures.

II. SEC INERTIA ON SPECIALIZED DISCLOSURES
If left unchecked, climate impacts could have significant and cascading
impacts across firms and segments of the financial sector. It could rise to the
level of a systemic risk, with catastrophic financial and social impacts. Taking
advantage of these collective action problems, many public corporations have
sown confusion about climate change in an effort to defer or delay regulatory
action on climate.79 This has also led to confusion on the part of investors as
well, further delaying climate action.80 Independent agencies, such as the
SEC, are important regulatory bulwarks against the escalation of climate risk
to systemic-level risks. Past failures to regulate this issue are instructive for
agency action moving forward.
The SEC regulates the issuance and trading of stocks, bonds, and other
securities in order to protect the investing public and promote the integrity of

76

Barkow, supra note 71, at 19.
Id. at 29.
78
Bressman & Thompson, supra note 71, at 670 (often called the “tail” or “fat tail” of
climate change risk); see Michael E. Mann, The ‘Fat Tail’ of Climate Change Risk,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 11, 2015, 9:01 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-fat-tailof-climate-change-risk_b_8116264 [perma.cc/7MFU-NQBR]).
79
The Union of Concerned Scientists also enumerate the decades-long campaign
described in internal corporate documents carried out by a handful of carbon-major
corporations such as Chevron, BP, Shell, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil and Peabody Energy
to deceive the American public by distorting the realities and risks of climate change, block
policies designed to hasten the transition to clean energy, and carry out a coordinated
campaign to spread climate misinformation in order to maintain their profitability. See
generally KATHY MULVEY & SETH SHULMAN, THE CLIMATE DECEPTION DOSSIERS:
INTERNAL FOSSIL FUEL MEMOS REVEALED DECADES OF CORPORATE DISINFORMATION 1
(2015), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/07/The-Climate-DeceptionDossiers.pdf [https://perma.cc/TYH3-HB2L] (providing a summary of seven “deception
dossiers” of internal company and trade association documents that have been leaked to the
public as part of a coordinated campaign to allegedly spread climate misinformation and
block climate action); Condon, supra note 5.
80
Condon, supra note 5, at 1.
77
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capital markets.81 Investor protection is one of its traditional mandates, as
well as the promotion of efficiency, competition and capital formation. 82 Full
and fair disclosure of financial information by regulated entities is considered
central to achieving the mandates of the SEC,83 and its statutory mandate to
require disclosure is broad.84
Disclosure requirements have primarily revolved around financial
materiality grounded in a principle-based approach of materiality. Issuers
themselves decide whether a risk is material enough to be disclosed. The SEC
requires that social and environmental issues be disclosed by issuers. Despite
its clear mandate, however, the SEC has a patchy record regulating issues of
climate risk. This section charts past agency failures to effectively regulate
climate and specialized disclosures, which can be connected to business
resistance and judicial hostility, or simply agency unwillingness to enforce
its own guidance and rules to cater for climate risks.
Regulation S-K forms the foundation of mandatory disclosure
requirements at the SEC. The key issue in disclosure requirements is whether
the information subject to the disclosure meets a threshold of materiality. This
principle-based approach is triggered by what an issuer considers to be
material. Information has been defined as material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it important in deciding
how to vote or make an investment decision.85 Since the 1970s, the SEC has
maintained disclosure rules regarding environmental liabilities that have a
financial impact on issuers.86 In 2010, the SEC issued guidance informing
issuers how and when climate risks may have to be disclosed as material
risks.87 The 2010 guidance was grounded in this principles-based disclosure
approach. Also in 2010, under the Dodd-Frank Act, the agency was mandated
by Congress to regulate investigation and disclosure of conflict minerals. 88 In
81

Anne M. Khademian, The Securities and Exchange Commission: A Small Regulatory
Agency with a Gargantuan Challenge, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 515, 518 (2002).
82
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,15
U.S.C. § 78c(f).
83
Id. at 515.
84
The SEC can promulgate rules for regulating disclosure “as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest” or for “the protection of investors”: Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(b); Letter from Jill E. Fisch, Professor of Business Law, University of Pennsylvania
Law School, on behalf of Securities Law Professors, to Gary Gensler, Chair SEC, Request
for Input on Climate Change Disclosure (Jun. 11, 2021).
85
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
86
See Exchange Act Release No. 33-5170, 36 FR 13989 (July 19, 1971) (regarding
environmental disclosures).
87
2010 SEC COMM’N GUIDANCE REGARDING DISCLOSURE RELATED TO CLIMATE
CHANGE, 75 FED. REG. 6290, 6296 (interpreting 17 C.F.R. pts 211, 231, 241) (hereinafter
SEC 2010 Climate Change Guidance).
88
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. § 1502;
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2020, the SEC modernized corporate disclosures, omitting any mention of
climate change. All three of these regulatory initiatives were unsuccessful in
regulating specialized disclosures, even though the 2010 Guidance was
agency initiated and the conflict minerals rule originated from a
Congressional mandate to the SEC.

A. The 2010 SEC Guidance on Climate Change
In 2010, the SEC issued interpretive guidance on climate change
disclosures.89 The guidance was an interpretive release that did not create any
new legal obligations or amend existing legal obligations for regulated
entities. The guidance instead clarified that climate-related disclosures could
appear under several existing obligations of disclosure under the SEC
regime.90 The guidance resulted from lobbying efforts by a coalition of
environmental groups, politicians, and investors.91 A formal petition was
submitted to the SEC in 2007 and a hearing in the Securities, Insurance, and
Investment Subcommittee of the Senate Banking Committee led to the
Financial Services Appropriations Bill, which called on the SEC to issue
guidance for publicly traded companies to assess and disclose risks from
climate change.92 It took several years for the SEC to respond, and the
guidance was approved by only a slight majority of SEC commissioners. At
the time, the SEC was under increased scrutiny due to the fallout of the 2008
financial crisis. Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar publicly acknowledged the
clear failure of the financial sector in 2008 to allocate capital in economically
productive ways and the need to regulate systemic risk.93
The 2010 guidance identified several areas where disclosure obligations
may arise, specifically in the description of the business, legal proceedings,
risk factors, and the Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations.94 Item 101 of Regulation S-K requires
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13p–1.
89
SEC, supra note 83.
90
Id. at 12-16.
91
Graham Erion, The Stock Market to the Rescue? Carbon Disclosure and the Future
of Securities-Related Climate Change Litigation 18 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT'L ENV’T. L. 164,
167 (2009).
92
Id.
93
Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Speech at the ABA Systemic Risk Panel: Regulatory
Reform That Optimizes the Regulation of Systemic Risk (Apr. 16, 2010),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch041610laa.htm
[https://perma.cc/4EPD5C2U].
94
Lorraine Malonza, SEC Climate Change Disclosures: Effects on Businesses, 26(4)
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an issuer to describe its business and that of its subsidiaries. The 2010
guidance noted that in relation to any GHG control mechanisms, Item 101
may require disclosure of any material estimated capital expenditures for
environmental control facilities for the remainder of an issuer’s current fiscal
year and its succeeding fiscal year and for any further periods.
Litigation risks must also be disclosed under Item 103 of Regulation SK.95 Item 103 requires affected companies to disclose any “material pending
legal proceedings.”96 It excludes the disclosure of routine litigation incidental
to the business. Litigation is not considered routine where it involves
proceedings that are material to the business or financial condition of the
registrant, proceedings that primarily include a claim for damages or involve
potential monetary sanctions or capital expenditures, or where a
governmental authority is a party to the proceedings that involve potential
monetary sanctions.
Investment risks must be disclosed under Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K,
which requires a registrant to include, where appropriate, a discussion of the
most significant factors that make an investment in the registrant speculative
or risky. The disclosure should clearly state the risk and specify how the
particular risk affects the particular issuer. According to the 2010 guidance,
this could include any existing or pending legislation or regulation that relates
to climate change at the state or federal level and could impact registrants in
the energy sector more than others.97 The guidance recommends that
companies should avoid disclosing generic risk factors and focus instead on
specific risks.
The final area where climate risks could be disclosed is under the
Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
of Operations (most commonly referred to as MD&A) under Item 303.
MD&A is designed to provide an explanation, in narrative form, of the
company’s financial statements. Within this context, the MD&A has three
overarching objectives: enhance overall financial disclosure, provide insights
into the quality and potential variability of the company's earnings and cash
flow, and generally provide investors with a view of the company through
the eyes of management. The MD&A should include historical and
prospective material disclosures that enable investors to assess the financial
condition and results of operations of the issuer, and, in particular, the issuer’s
future prospects. The MD&A should also disclose non-financial information
that bears on an issuer’s financial condition and operating performance.98
FIN. EXECUTIVE 64, 64 (2010).
95
17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2021).
96
Id.; see also SEC 2010 Climate Change Guidance, supra note 83, at 6293..
97
Id. at 6296.
98
Id. at 6295.
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In the MD&A, issuers must also disclose known trends, events, demands,
commitments, and uncertainties that are reasonably likely to have a material
effect on the financial condition or operating performance of the issuer.99 The
2010 guidance confirms that the time horizon of a known trend, event, or
uncertainty may be relevant to an issuer’s assessment of the materiality of the
matter and whether the impact is reasonably likely.100
As a result, the MD&A analysis will turn upon the issuer’s own
interpretation of the principle of materiality. The Basic v. Levinson101
definitions of contingent or speculative events are cited in the guidance in
regard to materiality. In particular, identification and disclosure of material
events will involve the balancing of both the indicated probability that the
event will occur against the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the
totality of the corporation’s activity.102 The SEC has specifically stated that
Item 303 on MD&A disclosure is more proactive and based on a “reasonably
likely standard.” If it is not reasonably likely that a known trend, demand,
commitment, event, or uncertainty is likely to come to fruition, then no
disclosure is required. If it is reasonably likely to come to fruition,
management must then determine whether the legislation or regulation, if
enacted, is reasonably likely to have a material effect on the registrant, its
financial condition, or the results of operations. Unless management
determines that a material effect is not reasonably likely, a disclosure is
required. As a result, even if there is uncertainty as to the exact nature of the
impacts of climate change or the timing of regulatory changes, the magnitude
of climate-related events and the high regulatory costs mean that climate risks
should, in theory, be disclosed.103 While the 2010 guidance anticipates most
climate-related disclosure will take place in the MD&A, Harper Ho, a
prominent academic in the area of securities and ESG risks, notes the
narrative form of this category of issuer disclosure makes it unsuitable for
detailed climate-related risk disclosure, and very difficult for investors to
compare to other corporate disclosures on climate risk.104
The SEC 2010 guidance was supposed to enhance consistency among
regulated entities regarding climate-related disclosures, but instead issuers
The SEC confirmed that reasonably likely is a lower disclosure standard than “more
likely than not.” 2002 SEC RELEASE NO. 33-8056: COMM’N STATEMENT ABOUT MGMT’S
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF FIN. CONDITION AND RESULTS OF OPERATION 3746, 3747-48
[67 FR 3746].
100
SEC 2010 Climate Change Guidance, supra note 83, at 6294.
101
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
102
SEC 2010 Climate Change Guidance, supra note 83, at 6294 (quoting Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F. 2d 833,
849 (1968))).
103
Erion, supra note 88, at 166.
104
Harper Ho, Disclosure Overload?, supra note 5, at 103.
99
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have largely ignored the guidance based on the notion that climate change is
too speculative to disclose.105 Studies conducted several years after the
guidance was issued noted that many investors still did not consider climate
risks as material risks, and so issuers did not disclose them.106 The SEC itself
rarely enforced its own guidance, with declining levels of comment letters
sent to public corporations from 2010 onwards. Between 2010 and 2013, the
SEC sent comment letters to twenty-three public companies regarding the
quality of (or lack of) their climate-related disclosures. Between 2014 and
2017, the SEC sent comment letters to fourteen public companies, and since
2017, the SEC sent comment letters to only three public companies.107 Until
the Biden Administration took office, the SEC did not enforce the
guidance.108 This may be due to lack of expertise within the agency to assess
whether climate-related disclosures are in fact misleading, or it could be due
to agency reluctance to enforce its own guidance. While the agency does have
some experience promulgating a rule in relation to social harms, business
resistance and judicial hostility to the conflict minerals rule proved to be its
undoing.

B. The Dodd-Frank Conflict Minerals Rule
The conflict minerals rule was issued in response to a Congressional
mandate to the SEC issued under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010. However, the rule faced significant
resistance from industry and many judicial hurdles were erected, leading to
its ultimate demise within the agency. The Dodd-Frank Act included a
mandate to the SEC to issue regulations requiring firms using so-called
“conflict minerals” to investigate and disclose the origin of those minerals.109
These minerals include gold, tin, tantalum, and tungsten that originated in or
105
Roshaan Wasim, Corporate (Non)Disclosure of Climate Change Information, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 1311, 1332 (2019).
106
JIM COBURN & JACKIE COOK, CERES, COOL RESPONSE: THE SEC & CORPORATE
CLIMATE CHANGE REPORTING: SEC CLIMATE GUIDANCE & S&P 500 REPORTING: 20102013 (Feb. 2014) (noting that 40% of S&P 500 firms did not include any climate related
disclosure at all in their 10-K filings in 2013).
107
Colin P. Myers, A Renewed Focus on the SEC’s Guidance RegardingDisclosure
Related
to
Climate
Change
AM.
BAR
ASS’N
(Apr.
12,
2021),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment_energy_resources/publications/ed/20210
412-a-renewed-focus-on-the-secs-guidance-regarding-disclosure/ [https://perma.cc/6LGJD72X].
108
See Acting Chair Herren Lee, Statement on the Review of Climate-Related Disclosure
(Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-statement-review-climaterelated-disclosure.
109
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 1502.
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in countries bordering the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The
minerals are used in many products, and so a number of manufacturers
through the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) trade association
objected to this requirement for specialized disclosure. Several directors of
fossil fuel corporations, such as ExxonMobil and Shell, sit on NAM’s board
of directors.110 NAM also funded the formation of the Main Street Investors
Coalition, which advocates against mandatory ESG and climate-related
disclosures.111 The Coalition was a vocal supporter of Trump-era regulations
that made it more difficult for investors to request and obtain climate-related
risk information.112 The congressional mandate under §1502 of the DoddFrank Act was designed to reduce financial support for mining activities that
were run by armed rebel groups in the DRC. Removing financial support for
those groups was intended to reduce the violence and promote peace and
security in a country ravaged by war.
The Conflict Minerals Regulations that the SEC promulgated in 2012
only applied to issuers with products that relied on conflict minerals. It
required those issuers to conduct a reasonable country of origin inquiry and
to conduct due diligence on the chain of custody. If the issuer found it could
not rule out the use of conflict minerals, it had to publish a statement on its
website that its products were not DRC-conflict-free. NAM objected to the
rule, in particular based on the lack of evidence provided by the SEC of the
benefits of the rule to the DRC. The District Court entered summary
judgment for the SEC, but NAM appealed. The appeal was affirmed in part
and reversed in part by the Court of Appeals and remanded back to the
SEC.113
The Court of Appeals, in its original 2014 decision, dismissed prior D.C.
Circuit decisions that required stringent cost-benefit analysis by the agency,

110

Condon, supra note 5, at 38.
Main Street Investors Coalition, Leading National Associations Announce Launch of
First-of-its-Kind Investor Coalition, CISION (May 22, 2018, 09:00 AM)
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/leading-national-associations-announcelaunch-of-first-of-its-kind-investor-coalition-300652366.html
[https://perma.cc/2FPF7F9J]; Nell Minow, The Main Street Investors Coalition is an Industry-Funded Effort to Cut
Off Shareholder Oversight, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jun. 14, 2018)
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/14/the-main-street-investors-coalition-is-anindustry-funded-effort-to-cut-off-shareholder-oversight/ [https://perma.cc/NN6V-H6YQ];
James McRitchie, NAM: Stop Supporting ‘Main Street Investors’ Coalition Say Real
Investors, CORPGOV.NET (Jan. 23, 2019) https://www.corpgov.net/2019/01/nam-stopsupporting-main-street-investors-coalition-say-real-investors
[https://perma.cc/J4F7EN6D].
112
Condon, supra note 5, at 38.
113
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. et al. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014), overruled by
Am. Meat Inst. v. United States Dep't of Agric. (AMI), 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
111
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finding the SEC had appropriately limited the costs of the final rule.114 NAM
had not disputed the costs of the rule, only its alleged benefits. The Court of
Appeals, in 2014, found the SEC had exhaustively considered its own data,
as well as cost estimates submitted during the comment period, and so it was
reasonable for the SEC not to be able to quantify the benefits of the rule;
however, the rule failed on First Amendment grounds instead.
After a series of concurrent decisions regarding restrictions on
commercial speech, in particular consideration of the applicability of the
Zauderer test115 regarding the constitutionality of compelled speech, the D.C.
Circuit reheard the decision en banc in 2015.116 The rule failed again on First
Amendment grounds, but the 2015 decision did focus on the specialized
nature of the disclosure requirement and its social, rather than investor,
protection aims.117 The SEC itself acknowledged in the preamble of its rule
that the rule requiring socially based disclosures was unlike any disclosure
rules the SEC normally issues, as it was not designed to protect investors.118
Perhaps due to its international and humanitarian aims, it was difficult for the
SEC to quantify the benefits of the rule, but the costs were estimated to be
very high, ranging between U.S. $3-4 billion in the first year.
The Court considered the applicability of the Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel case regarding compelled speech119 and whether it
should be applied in cases other than voluntary commercial advertising, as
done in American Meat Inst. v. U.S. Department of Agriculture (AMI).120
Although it ultimately held that the test in Zauderer did not apply in this
case, the Court proceeded to an analysis in the alternative of the test as an
alternative ground for its decision to demonstrate that even where it is applied
and intermediate scrutiny may apply, the statute and regulations violate the
First Amendment. Step one of the test in Zauderer, as outlined in AMI,
requires the identification and assessment of the adequacy of government
interest motivating the disclosure requirement by businesses. The Court
114

Id. at 369
Zauderer v. Office of Disc. Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) considered in AMI, 760
F.3d 18.
116
NAM III, 800 F.3d 518. For a discussion of the series of decisions on commercial
speech, which provoked the rehearing, see Recent Cases, First Amendment — Compelled
Commercial Disclosures — D.C. Circuit Limits Compelled Commercial Disclosures To
Voluntary Advertising, 129 HARV. L. REV. 819 (2016).
117
NAM III, 800 F.3d 521.
118
There was in fact some agency hesitation from the SEC Chair and critique of the
mandate provided to the SEC under §1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, see Gallagher, supra note
11 at 629 (critiquing the attribution of achieving socio-political issues such as conflict
minerals and extractive resources to the SEC, which sapped the bandwidth of the agency).
119
Zauderer v. Office of Disc. Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) cited in NAM III, 800 F.3d
522–26.
120
AMI, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
115
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accepted the SEC’s description of the government’s interest to be the
amelioration of the humanitarian crisis in the DRC, and it deemed this to be
a sufficient interest. Step two requires an evaluation of the effectiveness of
the measure in achieving the aim. It was here that the Court found there was
a lack of evidence regarding the benefits of the rule, meaning the rule failed
step two. The Court found the benefits cited were purely speculative
compared to the high level of costs involved.121 The Court found there was
evidence to the contrary—that forced disclosure would lead miners in the
DRC to lose their jobs and flee to join the rebel camps. The SEC had the
burden, under step two, to demonstrate the measure it adopted would in fact
alleviate the alleged harm to a material degree.122
The court was particularly troubled by the requirement of the rule that
issuers had to tell their consumers that their products were ethically tainted,
thus compelling, in the court’s view, issuers to confess to “blood on its
hands”123 with no concrete evidence of the benefits of the rule. The Court
invalidated the part of the rule requiring this statement, and the rule was
remanded back to the SEC; however, the SEC, which was skeptical of the
rule to begin with, never updated or comprehensively enforced the rule.124
This business resistance to agency action on social disclosures, combined
with judicial hostility to agency action, and agency inertia, led to the SEC
failing to enforce any remaining parts of its guidance. This case may be very
relevant to any judicial review of an SEC rule on climate-related disclosures
because these disclosures may be considered compelled commercial speech.
The recent AFPF v Bonta Supreme Court decision is relevant in this context
and is covered in Part IV below. A brief look at recent business responses to
the 2019 and 2020 petitions to the SEC on ESG disclosures will also be
instructive for the agency moving forward, before recommendations are
provided in Part VI.

121

NAM III, 800 F.3d 525.
Id. at 527. The court may also have been troubled by the expanded remit of the SEC
granted by the Dodd-Frank Act, as it imposed too much on state-based jurisdictions over
corporations writ-large, see Karmel, supra note 59, at 231, c.f. Carliss N. Chatman, The
Corporate Personhood Two-Step, 18(3) NEV. L.J. 811 (2018) (arguing that even state
jurisprudence omits a critical approach of corporations as entities).
123
NAM III, 800 F.3d 530.
124
In 2017 the SEC announced it was halting enforcement of some of the rule, see Sarah
N. Lynch, SEC Halts Some Enforcement of Conflict Minerals Rule Amid Review, REUTERS
(Apr. 7, 2017, 12:23 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-sec-conflictminerals/sechalts-some-enforcement-of-conflict-minerals-rule-amid-review-idUSKBN1792WX
[https://perma.cc/NG4C-TAGA]. The new administration may invigorate enforcement or
amendment of this rule, see Dynda A. Thomas, New Day for the US Conflict Minerals Rule,
NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/new-day-us-conflictminerals-rule [https://perma.cc/N4B5-Y2SU].
122
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C. The SEC “Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative,” petitions for ESG and
climate rulemaking, and 2019-2020 regulatory reforms
The SEC has a patchy record regulating ESG and climate disclosures. In
the past 10 years, it has effectively ignored calls for regulatory reform in this
area. More recently, the SEC issued three calls for public input into updating
and modernizing public companies’ disclosure requirements under
Regulation S-K. In 2014, the then newly appointed Chair Mary Jo White
began a “Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative” to identify and reform corporate
disclosure requirements, following a report on disclosure regulations
prepared by the SEC for Congress in December 2013.125 The SEC sought
public input on this initiative and received over 9,000 comments in
response.126 These public comments then informed the SEC’s Concept
Release on Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K,
published in 2016.127
The 2016 Concept Release sought further public input on modernizing
disclosure requirements under Regulation S-K, this time setting out 340
questions for consideration relating to existing business and financial
disclosure rules, eight of which touched on ESG issues, asking whether they
were considered material to investors. Two analyses of the more than 26,500
comments received in response to the 2016 Concept Release (including over
375 unique responses) found that a large majority focused on ESG issues,
calling on the SEC to improve how companies disclose ESG information in
their public filings.128 Nevertheless, when the SEC released new rules in 2018
and 2019 for the “Modernization and Simplification of Regulation S-K”, it
did not introduce any changes to the rules governing how companies provide
See Spotlight on Disclosure Effectiveness, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N. (Dec. 13,
2016),
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/disclosure-effectiveness.shtml
[https://perma.cc/Z8YB-YLEF]; Report on Review of Disclosure Requirements in
Regulation
S-K,
U.S.
Sec.
&
Exch.
Comm’n.
(Dec.
2013),
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2013/reg-sk-disclosure-requirements-review.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P75P-X92W]; Thomas White, SEC Disclosure Iniative Encounters
Resistance
on
Capitol
Hill,
JD
SUPRA
(Jul.
1,
2016),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/sec-disclosure-initiative-encounters-85830/.
126
Comments on Disclosure Effectiveness, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N.
https://www.sec.gov/comments/disclosure-effectiveness/disclosureeffectiveness.shtml
[https://perma.cc/KY58-CHXD].
127
Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, Release No. 3310064, 81 Fed. Reg. 23915 (Apr. 13, 2016).
128
Harper Ho, supra note 5, at 73; Tyler Gellasch, Towards a Sustainable Economy: A
Review of Comments to the SEC’s Disclosure Effectiveness Concept Release, 15 (Sept.
2016), https://www.ussif.org/Files/Public_Policy/Comment_Letters/Sustainable_Economy
_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CP5W-CFH8].
125
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disclosure of ESG or climate issues or risks.129
In October 2018, academics Cynthia Williams and Jill Fisch
submitted a rulemaking petition explicitly calling for the SEC to develop
mandatory rules for ESG disclosure.130 This petition was signed by investor
groups and associated organizations representing more than $5 trillion in
assets under management, including three state treasurers and the California
Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS). The SEC received over
4,000 comments in response to this petition, including 94 unique responses,
of which 93 were in support, with a particular focus on the need for rules
governing disclosure of companies’ political donations.131 In August 2019,
the SEC received another petition concerning climate change disclosures,
asking it to take action to prevent false and misleading statements by issuers
on climate change.132
The SEC did not publicly respond to either petition, nor were the
petitions mentioned when the SEC published another set of proposed rules in
August 2019 to modernize the description of business, legal proceedings, and
risk factor disclosures required under Regulation S–K (“2019 proposed
rules”).133 The 2019 proposed rules set out a “principles-based” approach to
broad categories of disclosure information, allowing companies to determine
the materiality of information, rather than prescribing specific line-item
disclosure requirements. The SEC sought public comments on the 2019
proposed rules, receiving almost 3,000 in response, with 98 unique
comments.134 Several comments criticized the “principles-based” approach
adopted by the SEC as rolling-back, rather than advancing, disclosure
requirements, potentially leading to “a lack of consistency and comparability
129

Harper Ho, supra note 5, at 69; see also Disclosure Update and Simplification release
No. 10532, 83 Fed. Reg. 50,148 (Oct. 4, 2018) (to be codified at 17 CFR pts. 210, 229-30,
240, 249 & 274) and FAST Act Modernization and Simplification of Regulation S-K, 84
Fed. Reg. 12,674 to be codified at 17 CFR pts. 229-30, 239-40, 249, 270 & 274-75 (Apr. 2,
2019).
130
Letter from Cynthia A. Williams et al., to Brent J. Fields, Secretary, SEC, Petition
for a Rulemaking on Environmental, Social, and Governance Disclosure (Oct. 1, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2018/petn4-730.pdf [https://perma.cc/U84R-KL4K].
131
Comments on Request for Rulemaking on Environmental, Social, and Governance
(ESG) Disclosure, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-730/4730.htm [https://perma.cc/76FG-RBGH].
132
Letter from Steve Milloy, to Vanessa Countryman, Acting Secretary, SEC, Petition
for Action Regarding Misleading Climate Disclosures (Aug. 13, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2019/petn4-751.pdf [https://perma.cc/NR88-VH3G].
133
Modernization of Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and 105, 84 Fed. Reg. 44,358
(proposed Aug. 23, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 229, 239 & 240).
134
Comments on Proposed Rule: Modernization of Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and
105 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., https://www.sec.gov/comments/ s7-11-19/s71119.htm
[https://perma.cc/D7KH-8JXB].
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in issuer disclosures” particularly in respect of ESG and climate-related
risks.135 Nevertheless, the final version of the rules released in late 2020
omitted any mention of climate change.136 In January 2020, the SEC issued
an additional proposed rule and related interpretive guidance on the
modernization of disclosure requirements under Regulation S-K.137 Both the
proposed rule and guidance were silent on the issue of climate change.
The omission of climate and ESG disclosure factors is often attributed to
agency concern expressed by issuers of over-disclosure, and the fear that this
will overload investors with non-material information. Investors, conversely,
seem concerned with under-disclosure by issuers. Harper Ho conducted an
exhaustive analysis of over 300 comments received by the agency in response
to the 2016 Concept Release. Her analysis reveals very different positions put
forward by issuers and investors. Most investors’ comments focused on
under-disclosure of material information by issuers,138 while the majority of
issuers’ comments asserted that ESG disclosure would overburden
investors.139 Issuers were divided on the materiality of ESG issues, although
the majority agreed that certain ESG factors were material.140 The issuers that
identified ESG factors as material were more likely to find that requiring the
disclosure of ESG factors should fall within the authority of the SEC.141
Investors, on the other hand, uniformly affirmed the SEC’s authority in this
area to mandate ESG disclosure.142
The SEC itself was similarly split on the omission of ESG and climaterelated disclosures in its 2020 proposal and guidance. The then SEC
Chairman, Jay Clayton, issued a statement regarding the SEC proposals.143 A
135

See Letter from Fiona Reynolds, Chief Executive Officer, Principles for Responsible
Investment,
to
Vanessa
Countryman,
Sec’y,
SEC
(Oct.
30,
2019),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-19/s71119-6368809-196430.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DD7J-4WM6]; see also Letter from Thomas L. Riesenberg, Director of
Legal and Regulatory Policy, Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, to Vanessa
Countryman, Sec’y, SEC (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-19/s711196682134-205446.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZGX-MLYK].
136
Modernization of Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and 105, 85 Fed. Reg. 63,726 (Oct.
8, 2020).
137
Commission Guidance on Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations, Release Nos. 33-10751; 34-88094 (Jan. 30, 2020).
138
Harper Ho, supra note 5, at 74.
139
Id. at 119.
140
Id. at 116–17.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Chair Jay Clayton, Statement on Proposed Amendments to Modernize and Enhance
Financial Disclosures; Other Ongoing Disclosure Modernization Initiatives; Impact of the
Coronavirus; Environmental and Climate-Related Disclosure, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N.
(Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/clayton-mda-2020-01-30
[https://perma.cc/X8J4-CVC9].
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significant section of his statement refers to ESG and climate-related
disclosure efforts. His comments note that in his view, the 2010 guidance is
sufficient, although he conditioned his comments by stating they may change
in light of various factors, including actions by policymakers, actions by
market participants, and the availability of new information more generally.
He noted one of the major issues associated with climate-related disclosures
is the forward-looking nature of disclosures, which are often based on
estimates and assumptions that are complex, uncertain, and issuer- and
industry- specific. Clayton did note that the SEC was engaging with
international counterparts in both bilateral and multilateral forums, including
with the Task Force on Climate-Related Disclosures through the Financial
Stability Board, of which the SEC is a member. Commissioner Clayton was
publicly skeptical about the role the SEC should play in this area. In a 2019
interview, he stated that the SEC should not initiate a rulemaking that
standardizes ESG disclosures, as that would contravene the SEC’s
mandate.144 He also noted that such an approach would be contrary to the
long-standing commitment to a materiality-based disclosure regime and
could effectively (and inappropriately) substitute the SEC’s judgment for the
issuer’s judgment on operational matters.
Commissioner Hester M. Peirce was also outspoken in support of the
exclusion of climate change and ESG indicators. Commissioner Peirce based
her statement on her support for the maintenance of a materiality-focused
approach.145 Peirce noted that calls for an SEC disclosure regime stemmed
from “an elite crowd pledging loudly to spend virtuously other people’s
money.” In Peirce’s view, the existing principle-based materiality threshold
worked well, as it served to assess risks through the prism of a reasonable
investor, focusing on the long-term financial value of the firms they invest in.
To depart from this test, according to Peirce, would lead to information
overload, increased costs, and litigation risks, as well as reduced investment
returns, reduced attractiveness of public capital markets, and a misallocation
of capital.146 However, in the context of the systemic risks of climate change,
this approach is arguably inadequate.
In contrast, SEC Commissioner Allison Heron Lee publicly critiqued the
lack of updated guidance on climate change and the disregard for the
Eve Tahmincioglu, SEC Chief Takes on Short-Termism and ESG’ Directors &
Boards, DIRECTORS & BOARDS (2019), https://www.directorsandboards.com/articles/single
sec-chief-takes-short-termism-and-esg [https://perma.cc/GB6Z-87MC].
145
Commissioner Hester M. Pierce, Statement on Proposed Amendments to Modernize
and Enhance Financial Disclosures, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N. (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/peirce-mda-2020-01-30
[
[https://perma.cc/74AL-G22R].
146
Id.
144
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“overwhelming” requests from investors that were submitted through
comment letters and petitions for rulemaking.147 Lee stated that investors
were asking the SEC to require consistent, reliable, and comparable
disclosures of the risks and opportunities related to sustainability measures,
particularly climate risk. Commissioner Lee noted that the existing, broad,
principles-based “materiality” standard (outlined above) has not produced
sufficiently detailed disclosures to ensure that investors receive consistent,
reliable, and comparable disclosures,148 and she advocated for more action
from the SEC on this issue. These public statements pointed to a heated
debate within the SEC in 2020 on the issue of climate-related disclosures.149
After the 2020 election, Allison Heron Lee became the Acting Chair of the
SEC. At the same time, the agency began to focus its regulatory efforts on
climate-related disclosures. The agency’s approach to climate-related
disclosures has changed dramatically. Part III demonstrates the critical role
that the SEC can play in requiring transparency by issuers on the risks that
climate change poses, and why this type of regulatory action is so important.

III. THE SEC AND CLIMATE RISK
This section illustrates the systemic nature of climate risk and why it is
important for the SEC to regulate these types of risks. While the SEC is
ostensibly an independent agency, it is not entirely insulated from executive
influence, and perhaps more importantly, from the influence of market actors.
Any change in direction by these political and market actors in connection
with climate disclosures will be important for agency action going forward.
These shifts in approaches are primarily due to the escalating risks of the
negative impacts of climate change (or climate risks). It is no longer a
question of whether public companies will disclose climate-related risks, but
how they will disclose them.150 This section also assesses comments from the
public, focusing on investors and issuers, in response to the SEC’s 2021
recent call for comments on climate-related disclosures.
The risks of climate change are extremely high, not only to the general
public but to financial entities, including those regulated by the SEC. Many
Commissioner Allison Herren Lee, ‘Modernizing’ Regulation S-K: Ignoring the
Elephant in the Room, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N. (Jan 30, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-mda-2020-01-30 [https://perma.cc/4YPRF69U].
148
Id.
149
Cydney Posner, SEC Debate on Climate Disclosure Regulation Gets Heated,
COOLEY PUBCO (Feb. 6, 2020), https://cooleypubco.com/2020/02/06/sec-debate-climatedisclosure-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/H762-XZC].
150
Vizcarra, supra note 5.
147
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of these entities are public corporations, so the financial risks of climate
change extend to the investors in those corporations. Investors in public
corporations are primarily pension funds or mutual funds, and so climate risks
threaten the financial stability of many Americans’ investment portfolios.
Although the levels and probabilities of risk are uncertain and could be better,
or (more likely) worse,151 than expected, climate change is estimated to cost
between US $4 to $43 trillion by the end of the century, and the risks are so
great they could threaten international fiscal stability.152 Climate-related risks
151
See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], CLIMATE CHANGE
2007
SYNTHESIS
REPORT
5
(Lenny
Bernstein
et
al.
eds,
2008),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ar4_syr_full_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6SCF-4M4B] (“There is very high confidence that the net effect of human
activities since 1750 has been one of warming.”); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE [IPCC], CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT SUMMARY FOR
POLICYMAKERS 2, 4, 8 (2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_
SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf [https://perma.cc/AV2R-87QJ] (providing a report on a number of
environmental factors including: atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane
and nitrous oxide [being] unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years;” “[w]arming of
the climate system is unequivocal;” and “[c]ontinued emission of greenhouse gases will
cause further warming and long-lasting changes . . . increasing the likelihood of severe,
pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems.”), [hereinafter IPCC, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2014]; Kendra Pierre-Louis, Ocean Warming Is Accelerating Faster Than Thought,
New
Research
Finds,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
10,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/10/climate/ocean-warming-climate-change.html
[https://perma.cc/YW28-DZDW] (“[T]he world’s oceans are warming far more quickly than
previously thought . . . .”); Brett Molina, ‘Dangerous’ Antarctic Glacier Has a Hole Roughly
Two-Thirds Area of Manhattan, Scientists Warn, USA TODAY (Jan. 31, 2019, 7:38 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2019/01/31/thwaites-glacier-antarctica-meltingcould-impact-sea-levels-nasa/2729840002/ [https://perma.cc/G3R6-3ZAU] (“Thwaites has
been described as one of the world’s most dangerous glaciers because its demise could lead
to rapid changes in global sea levels.”); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
[IPCC], SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND LAND: AN IPCC SPECIAL
REPORT ON CLIMATE CHANGE, DESERTIFICATION, LAND DEGRADATION, SUSTAINABLE
LAND MANAGEMENT, FOOD SECURITY, AND GREENHOUSE GAS FLUXES IN TERRESTRIAL
ECOSYSTEMS,
(Valérie
Masson-Delmotte
et
al.
eds.,
2019),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/4/2020/02/SPM_Updated-Jan20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CWC4-9YJ6] (stating with high confidence that since the pre-industrial
period, the land surface air temperature has risen nearly twice as much as the global average
temperature and that climate change, including increases in frequency and intensity of
extremes, has adversely impacted food security and terrestrial ecosystems as well as
contributed to desertification and land degradation in many regions).
152
Mark Carney, in his position as the Governor of the Bank of England, highlighted
the potential risks of climate change to both industries and international fiscal stability. He
noted that climate change could negatively affect between four to forty-three trillion dollars
of global assets by the end of the century. See THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, THE
COST OF INACTION: RECOGNIZING THE VALUE AT RISK FROM CLIMATE CHANGE (2015),
https://eiuperspectives.economist.com/sites/default/files/The%20cost%20of%20inaction_0.
pdf [https://perma.cc/6X2E-MYLK].
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are usually categorized as physical risks from climate-related impacts,
liability risks from litigation, and transition risks fom changing regulatory
requirements.153 As these risks become clearer over time, governments and
businesses are becoming increasingly concerned about the risks climate
change poses to financial systems.
A. Physical and transition risks of climate change
Climate change poses physical and transition risks to societies, firms, and
financial systems. However, measuring and managing climate risk is
complex, partly because climate science itself is complex. Climate science
relies on models and forecasts, and the level of severity of impacts of climate
change can be uncertain. Some risks, such as physical risks due to sea level
rise, can be easier to anticipate and measure based on climate models. More
frequent and severe weather events such as floods, droughts, and storms can
do physical damage to critical infrastructure and to assets owned by
individuals and firms. Standard & Poor has concluded that corporate physical
assets are increasingly in harm’s way as the impacts of climate change
intensify over time.154 Decreases in housing prices could have impacts on the
real economy, possibly making some risks and properties uninsurable.155
Mark Carney’s 2015 speech to insurers in Lloyds of London stated that the risks of
climate change are threefold: physical risks to insured assets, liability risks from litigation,
and transition risks, including financial risks from changing regulatory requirements to
transition to a lower-carbon economy. He also highlighted the role of initial lawsuits against
pension fund managers of carbon major companies in elevating long-term risks of climate
change and their implications for fiduciary duties. His speech at Lloyds of London in 2015
was the precursor to the establishment of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial
Disclosures by the G20. Nina Chestney, G20 Task Force Issues Framework for ClimateRelated
Financial
Disclosure,
REUTERS
(June
28,
2017,
11:08 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climatechange-financial-disclosure/g20-task-forceissues-framework-for-climate-related-financial-disclosure-idUSKBN19K0JW
[https://perma.cc/39VU-TXW2].
154
Guatam Naik and Rick Lard, Corporate Physical Assets Increasingly in Harm’s Way
as Climate Change Intensifies, S&P GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE 1 (2021).
155
Thor Benson, The Climate Crisis is Poised to Make Huge Swaths of America Totally
Uninsurable,
DAILY
BEAST
(Sept.
15,
2019,
5:00
A.M.),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/climate-redlining-could-soon-make-millions-of-us-homestotally-uninsurable [https://perma.cc/REN8-3YKM] (referring to “climate redlining”
affecting coastal properties as well as properties vulnerable to wildfires); MAX J. RUDOLPH,
12TH
ANNUAL
SURVEY
OF
EMERGING
RISKS
8
(Mar.
2019),
https://www.soa.org/globalassets/assets/files/resources/research-report/2019/12themerging-risk-survey.pdf (noting that 22% of actuaries stated that climate change was their
top emerging risk); Christopher Flavelle, Climate Change And the Nightmare Scenario for
Florida’s
Coastal
Homeowners,
INS.
J.
(Apr.
20,
2017),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2017/04/20/448504.htm
[https://perma.cc/P6P7-Y5W4].
153

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3952915

8-Mar-22]

THE SEC AND CLIMATE RISK

37

Certain sectors are more at risk than others. For example, the insurance
industry is increasingly concerned about the risks of climate change.156 The
real estate industry may also be negatively affected.157 The energy and
utilities industries often site production, refinement, and distribution
operations in coastal areas that are vulnerable to sea-level rise, storm surges,
and flooding.158 Utilities infrastructure are also vulnerable to heat, as
illustrated by the recent bankruptcy and US $13.5 billion settlement paid by
Pacific Gas & Electric due to its role in the California wildfires. 159 As
Madison Condon, a scholar whose work focuses on climate risks, points out,
much of the capital stock of infrastructure in the U.S. was built to withstand
temperature and weather extremes based on historical models, and these
models no longer hold in the context of climate-related extremes.160 The
power outages in Texas in early 2021 due to unanticipated weather extremes
are a prime example of this.161
Despite the level of physical risks facing firms, markets are not accurately
incorporating these risks into firm value. Bolton and Kacperczyk, carbon
pricing and finance experts, found that even in countries exposed to greater
damages from climate disasters, there was no significant difference in carbon
premiums, suggesting that carbon premiums do not reflect the physical risks
of climate change.162 This is partly due to a lack of precise, asset-level data
156

DELOITTE, ANALYSIS: HOW INSURANCE COMPANIES CAN PREPARE FOR RISK FROM
CLIMATE
CHANGE,
https://www.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/financial-services/articles/
insurance-companies-climate-change-risk.html [https://perma.cc/JK4V-RQSG].
157
Christopher Flavelle, Rising Seas Threaten an American Institution: The 30-Year
Mortgage, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/19/climate/
climate-seas-30-year-mortgage.html [https://perma.cc/N3RZ-29CB].
158
Craig Zamuda, et al. 2018: Energy Supply, Delivery, and Demand. In Impacts,
Risks, and Adaptation in UNITED STATES: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT,
VOLUME II U.S. Global Change Research Program, Washington, DC, USA, 176.
159
Ivan Penn, PG&E, Troubled California Utility, Emerges from Bankruptcy N.Y.
TIMES
(July
28,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/business/energyenvironment/pge-bankruptcy-ends.html [https://perma.cc/TMB3-7Z9V].
160
Condon, supra note 75, at 5.
161
Roshanak Nateghi, The Texas Blackouts Showed How Climate Extremes Threaten
Energy Systems Across the US, THE CONVERSATION (Mar. 2, 2021, 8:24 AM)
https://theconversation.com/the-texas-blackouts-showed-how-climate-extremes-threatenenergy-systems-across-the-us-155834 [https://perma.cc/8YC8-56VY]; Alex Klass, Lawfare
Podcast: Alex Klass on the Texas Energy Crisis, (Feb. 23, 2021),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-alex-klass-texas-energy-crisis
[https://perma.cc/VGG2-9SUC]; see also Danielle Stokes, Zoning for Climate Change, 106
MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)) (citing the opportunities in the Biden Administration to
restructure zoning laws to promote renewable energy infrastructure that can withstand
climate extremes).
162
Patrick Bolton & Marcin Kacpercyzk, Global Pricing of Carbon-Transition Risk,
(Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/Transition-Risk_Bolton-1217-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/NJG7-U3H2].
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that investors need in order to accurately assess the physical risk facing a
firm’s assets.163 Information currently disclosed in financial reports is often
disclosed at the aggregate level, and specific disclosures such as the levels of
energy and water used and needed by firms to operate and the locations and
levels of exposure of assets, are often missing from these reports.164 In
addition, even if investors are aware of the risks facing a firm due to climate
change, they may hold on to these risky investments, knowing that climateskeptics or uninformed investors will maintain demand for the investment, at
least in the immediate future.165 This behavior can exacerbate existing, shortterm investment habits and delay the much needed transition of capital away
from fossil fuel industries, further illustrating the need for uniform climaterelated disclosures.
Corporations are failing to account for climate risk, particularly physical
risks. Quantitative research conducted by Goldstein looked at 1,630 large
companies’ voluntary reporting on climate change to investors, focusing on
physical risks.166 The report concludes that companies were not adequately
characterizing climate risk in their voluntary reporting or adequately
preparing for its impacts.167 The authors found that the potential magnitude
of the financial impacts of climate risk was a key blind spot for companies.168
Directors and managers were also failing to account for indirect and systemic
characteristics of climate risk.169 Corporations are focusing only on a narrow
view of climate risk, perhaps in part due to a predisposition to short-term
thinking, the tendency to heavily discount future costs, and the potential of
disclosure of climate risks to lead to a corporate disadvantage in the short
term.170
Climate change also involves transition risks, which are particularly acute
for fossil-intensive industries and firms. Policy shifts at the national and
international level stemming from the Paris Agreement could lead to a
163

Condon, supra note 75, at 5.
Id.
165
Id. at 40.
166
Allie Goldstein et al., The Private Sector’s Climate Change Risk and Adaptation
Blind Spots, 9 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 18, 18 (2018).
167
Id.
168
Id. It should be noted that the insurance industry has been one of the first movers on
climate action, due to their high exposure. See, e.g., ALLIANZ GROUP & WORLD WILDLIFE
FUND, CLIMATE CHANGE AND INSURANCE: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES,
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 3 (2006), http://www.climateneeds.umd.edu/pdf/
AllianzWWFreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/CSQ7-MALT].
169
Goldstein et al., supra note 161, at 20–21, 23. While the authors focused only on
physical risks, they compared the estimated price tag of climate change in the trillions of
dollars with the aggregate financial risks reported from companies which only amounted to
tens of billions of dollars.
170
Id. at 23.
164
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transition to a green economy. New policy imperatives, even voluntary
commitments to net-zero emissions by corporations, may lead to significant
shifts in asset values and higher costs of doing business, particularly for fossil
fuel companies.171 Transition risks include climate liability risks from climate
litigation efforts, as well as technology, market changes, and reputational
risks. Cash flows at highly exposed firms could decrease as these firms incur
higher costs from emissions abatement and possible litigation.172 These
higher costs could lead to credit defaults or firms going out of business.173
Reputational risks, including social backlash, could lead to higher discount
rates for firms.174 Bolton and Kacperczyk note that transition risks may
already be reflected in markets, although transition risks may not always be
linked to exposure to physical risks.175 Due to their nature, and the inherent
uncertainty in regulatory and policy shifts, transition risks can be more
difficult to value, measure, and disclose for firms.
Without significant mitigation and adaptation efforts, climate change will
negatively affect financial systems around the world. The risks of climate
change are estimated to impact a significant portion of global assets,
negatively impacting global fiscal stability, with up to 30% of global
manageable assets at risk.176 Between now and the end of the century, this
could lead to between four to forty-three trillion dollars’ worth of assets at
risk.177 A report by SASB in 2021 stated that climate-related risks are now
present in 68 of 77 industries, comprising approximately US $45.1 trillion or
89% of U.S. equities by market capitalization.178
Most industries and firms will be affected by climate change in some way,
and action on climate change requires a reallocation of capital. An abrupt
devaluation of assets as a result of non-linear climate impacts could lead to
pro-cyclical crystallization of losses and a tightening of financial
conditions—a Minsky moment—which in itself could jeopardize fiscal
stability.179 A climate-friendly capital re-allocation should ideally take place
171
BANK OF ENGLAND, CLIMATE CHANGE: WHAT ARE THE RISKS TO FINANCIAL
STABILITY?, https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/knowledgebank/ climate-change-what-arethe-risks-to-financial-stability [https://perma.cc/7TUN-HAKZ] (last visited Jul. 13, 2021).
172
Bolton & Kacperczyk, supra note 157, at 12.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Global manageable assets are the total stock of assets held by non-bank financial
institutions. See THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 148, at 4.
177
Id. at 2; Goldstein et al., supra note 161, at 18.
178
SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., CLIMATE RISK TECHNICAL BULLETIN 5
(2021 ed. Apr. 2021) https://www.sasb.org/knowledge-hub/climate-risk-technical-bulletin/
[https://perma.cc/2WM5-NXLJ].
179
Carney, supra note 31, at 13. A Minsky moment refers to the onset of market collapse
due to a sudden shift or decline in market sentiment, named after the economist, Hyman
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in a phased and orderly fashion to avoid a “climate Minsky” moment.180
Public corporations can be an important part of the energy transition. As
Vandenbergh and Gilligan note, private environmental governance and
corporate activities can achieve major greenhouse gas emission reductions.
They estimate that private action could reduce emissions by roughly 1,000
million tons of CO2 per year between 2016-2025.181 In order for this to occur,
investors must be informed of the climate risks facing the firms they invest
in. More information on climate risks should, in theory, allow investors to reallocate their capital appropriately, and it should reduce the costs to investors
of submitting shareholder proposals and attempting to compare vague
corporate statements regarding climate-related financial risks. Therefore,
mandating climate related disclosures will benefit investors and firms, as well
as the general public.
The world is entering uncharted territory where stable climatic conditions
can no longer be assumed. The risks of climate change are escalating, and
climate change will affect most countries and societies in unexpected and
often non-linear ways. Impacts will be felt across economies, and they will
likely be differentiated across, and even within, industries and amongst firms.
These impacts will necessarily have consequences for financial systems,
firms and—of course—investors and the companies they invest in.
B. Climate change as systemic risk
The risks of transition to a low-carbon economy are so great that the
Financial Stability Board determined that if the re-pricing of assets occurs at
an abrupt rate, it could negatively impact global financial stability.182
Minsky’s, credit cycle.
180
Lisa Benjamin & Stelios Andreadakis, Corporate Governance and Climate Change:
Smoothing Temporal Dissonance to a Phased Approach, 40 BUS. L. REV. 146 (2019).
181
Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan M. Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, 40 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan M. Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, 40 COLUM. J.
ENV’T. L. 217, 220 (2015) (identifying private environmental governance as actions by
private organizations performed without government collaboration, delegation or
outsourcing). In the existing government gridlock, Vandenbergh and Gilligan explain that
while private actions are a second-best option to government action, these activities are
critical and could reduce emissions by roughly 1,000 million tons of CO 2 per year between
2016-2025. See id. at 160; Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Drivers of Corporate Climate
Mitigation, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM 29 (2018); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private
Actors: Part of the Problem, Part of the Solution, in ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM 48 (2017); see
Hari M. Osofsky et al., Energy Re-Investment, 94 IND. L.J. 595, 638 (2019).
182
FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, PROPOSAL FOR A DISCLOSURE TASK FORCE ON
CLIMATE-RELATED
RISKS
1
(Nov.
9,
2015),
http://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/Disclosure-task-force-on-climate-related-risks.pdf [https://perma.cc/48JLD2Z4].
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Financial institutions, such as banks and other lending agencies, are
particularly exposed. These entities provide capital to firms and are often
interconnected, so significant impacts in one or several of these institutions
can have significant impacts on other capital providers. Impacts on large,
complex, and interconnected financial institutions could transmit financial
stress throughout the financial system,183 impacting firms that may not
traditionally be considered vulnerable to climate risks. Climate change has
now transitioned from an ethical, voluntary issue into a material financial risk
for most firms and thus for most investors.
Due to the ubiquity of climate risks across financial systems, investors
cannot diversify away from this risk.184 The level and scale of these risks vary
and can be specific, systematic, and systemic. Specific risks attach to certain
industries or even corporations due to their locations, physical infrastructure,
business models, technology, or corporate preparedness.185 Climate risks can
also be systematic, as they are inherent to entire markets and are undiversifiable.186 Finally, climate risks can be systemic, and they can trigger
the collapse of an entire market or financial system.187
There is no one definition of systemic risk in relation to the financial
system. Other than an understanding that systemic risk involves widespread
impact, there is little agreement on the type of trigger events or nature of
activities that could cause a market meltdown.188 Lack of a coherent
definition leads to problems in effectively regulating systemic risk.189 After
the 2008 financial crisis, Steven Schwarcz, a distinguished professor in law
and business, suggested a wider definition, identifying several events and
impacts that could be classified as systemic risks.190 These include cascading
183
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and cumulative losses that ignite successive losses within markets or financial
institutions, a modest shock that causes volatility in asset prices and
significant decreases in corporate liquidity and potential bankruptcies, or a
default by one large market participant, which could cause repercussions for
other market participants due to the interlocking nature of the financial
markets, such as the banking industry.191 In all three scenarios, there are
different triggers and consequences. The loss of availability of capital or
increased cost of capital are the two most serious and direct consequences of
systemic risk, and they justify its regulation.192
Due to increased disintermediation, banks are no longer the only
sources of capital to industry, and so systemic risk must be approached from
not only an institutional, but also a market perspective.193 Modern finance
theory posits that to the extent that a risk affects markets, it can be protected
against through the diversification of investments. This theory may not apply
in the context of systemic risks. Systemic risks cannot be diversified away,
and so institutional investors with a broad range of diversified investments in
particular are vulnerable to systemic risks.194 These types of investors may
not be able to shift their investments out of vulnerable asset classes to avoid
economy-wide impacts, as these would affect their entire portfolio of
assets.195 Schwarcz advocates for a more integrated approach to systemic risk
that focuses on critical financial intermediaries such as banks, but also
focuses on markets and institutions that are not critical financial
intermediaries but that may become vulnerable to, or trigger systemic risks.196
Efficiency should not be the only motivation for regulating financial
markets, as systemic risks pose risks to the entire financial system (as
opposed to specific risks within the financial system); therefore, social
impacts such as poverty, health impacts, crime, and wider social breakdown
should also be considered when regulating systemic risks.197 Climate change
itself poses systemic risks to financial systems, imposes risks to critical social
indicators, such as health and public safety, and exacerbates poverty and
191
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economic inequality; therefore, it is a systemic risk that should be regulated.
While climate-related disclosures are not a panacea to regulating and
mitigating climate risk, mandating climate risk disclosures is an important
tool in managing climate change and reducing emissions more broadly. If
investors are aware of the risks facing their investments, they can use that
information to participate in firm management to avoid, or at least minimize,
climate-related risks. Efforts by hedge fund Engine No. 1 to appoint its
nominees to the board of directors of ExxonMobil is a prime example of
investor behavior targeted at firms to incentivize more climate-related
management behavior. Investors could also diversify their investments away
from fossil-fuel intensive firms, and towards more climate-friendly products,
services, and firms. The net-zero energy transition will require an estimated
US $5 trillion in investment over the coming decades, with institutional
investors expected to play a key role.198 Conversely, lack of accurate climate
disclosures can lead to mispricing of risk and misallocation of capital. This
can hinder climate action and continue to subsidize fossil fuel investments,
thereby exacerbating the impacts of climate change and contributing to the
escalation of climate risk to a systemic risk.199
C. The SEC’s role in regulating climate risk
In 2011, SEC Chairman Mary L. Shapiro separated systemic risk into two
areas that are relevant for the SEC.200 The first being a risk of a sudden, nearterm systemic seizure or cascading failure. The second type of risk being a
longer-term risk that financial systems will unintentionally favor large,
systematically important institutions over smaller, more nimble competitors,
reducing the system’s ability to innovate and adapt to change. In relation to
financial systemic risk, Alan Greenspan noted that “[i]t is generally agreed
that systemic risk represents a propensity for some sort of significant
financial system disruption. Nevertheless, after the fact, one observer might
use the term “market failure” to describe what another would deem to have
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been a market outcome that was natural and healthy, even if harsh."201
Therefore, declines or extinctions of certain businesses in a capitalistmotivated “creative destruction”202 may not be included in a definition of
systemic risk, provided the decline of such businesses or even industries do
not have a system-wide knock on effect.
Investors rely on SEC filings as well as firm statements on climate change
to assess risks, including systemic risks. One report estimated that 82% of
asset managers relied on SEC filings, and 72% relied on sustainability reports
of companies;203 therefore actions by the SEC on this issue are both relevant
and important for investors. Investors need decision-useful information on
the risks facing firms due to climate change, particularly where climate risks
are or will become a material financial issue for companies. An ideal
approach to systemic risk would be to manage it ab initio, in order to
eliminate the risk of systemic collapse.204 Climate-related risk disclosures can
have such a prophylactic effect205 and are important tools in managing
systemic risks, such as climate change.206
Climate-related disclosures can provide strong incentives to companies
to take proactive steps to minimize and manage climate risks, and they are
often part of larger environmental, social, and governance disclosure
efforts.207 Disclosures can reduce asymmetric information between market
participants. Disclosure’s purpose is to level the playing field between issuers
and investors and to reduce information asymmetries.208 This in turn
promotes investor confidence in capital markets, which thus enables growth,
access to capital, and protection of the public.209 It should be noted that
disclosure is not a panacea, however, as market participants are likely to be

201
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motivated by self-preservation and not systemic risk management.210 For
example, where climate-related disclosures highlight risks and would attract
increased scrutiny from shareholders, the press, or regulators,211 firms may
not want to fully disclose climate-related risks. Disclosure does not prevent
risky products being placed on the market,212 but it allows investors to make
their own decisions regarding these risks.
As a result, clear and consistent disclosure obligations would be useful
for investors and firms. SEC regulatory action in this area would be a critical
piece of the carbon transition puzzle. While climate-related disclosures would
not fix the problem of climate change (only emissions reductions or removals
can do that), disclosures can highlight systemic risks to investors and provide
a roadmap for investors to start a phased transition of capital away from
fossil-fuel-intensive industries and towards renewable and climate-safe
investments, if they so choose. There is an argument that disclosures can
motivate issuers themselves to transition away from fossil fuel investments
as capital and insurance become scarcer due to investor flight;213 therefore
disclosure of the risks of climate change can highlight to issuers the risks of
continuing in fossil fuel industries and may benefit both issuers and investors.
Conversely, there is an argument that investors that continue to invest in
fossil fuels may reap benefits, at least in the short term.214 Either way,
disclosures can highlight the risks of fossil fuel investments and allow
investors—and issuers—to make climate-informed choices.
Financial stability is more than just the avoidance of systemic risk. It also
encapsulates the impacts of market failures on market participants
globally.215 As a result, managing systemic risk is beneficial for market
participants, including investors. The International Organization of Securities
Commissioners (IOSCO) has highlighted the unique perspective that
securities regulators around the world have in maintaining the integrity of
securities markets. IOSCO’s Objectives and Principles of Securities
Regulation sets out 38 Principles of securities regulation, which are based
upon three objectives of securities regulation: protecting investors, ensuring
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fair, efficient, and transparent markets, and reducing systemic risk.216 In a
February 2021 press release, IOSCO stated the urgent need for globally
consistent, comparable, and reliable sustainability disclosure standards.217
IOSCO’s Sustainable Finance Taskforce issued a report in June 2021 that
charted a “climate first” approach, which established a prototype of a climaterelated financial disclosure standard using the TCFD recommendation as its
foundation.218 Securities regulators around the world are implementing and
sometimes mandating climate-related financial disclosures, and the U.S. is
increasingly out of step with its global allies on this issue. The SEC sits on
the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), which is Chaired by the
Treasury Secretary. FSOC is a collaboratory body with a clear statutory
mandate to identify risks and respond to emerging threats to the U.S. financial
system, and to constrain excessive risks in the financial system. Recognizing
the policy void on climate-related disclosures, the SEC recently solicited
comments from the public on the issue of climate-related financial
disclosures. The following section assesses a number of responses to this call,
focusing on investor and issuer responses.
D. The 2021 SEC Call for Comments on Climate-Related Financial
Disclosures
In February 2021, Acting Chair Lee directed the Division of Corporation
Finance to enhance its focus on climate-related disclosure in public company
filings. In particular, Lee directed the Division of Corporation Finance to
focus on the extent to which public companies address the topics identified
in the 2010 SEC guidance and to absorb critical lessons on how the market is
currently managing climate-related risks.219 The announcement was the
216
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precursor to an agency effort to update the 2010 guidance. The following
month, the agency announced the establishment of an enforcement task force
on climate and ESG related disclosures.220 The initial focus of the task force
will be to identify any material gaps or misstatements in issuers’ disclosure
of climate risks under existing rules. The task force will also analyze
disclosure and compliance issues relating to investment advisers’ and funds’
ESG strategies.
In March 2021, the SEC solicited comments on its current approach to
climate-related disclosures.221 The SEC requested public input on the SEC’s
current disclosure rules and guidance as they apply to climate change
disclosures, along with whether and how they should be modified. The
agency welcomed a broad range of comments, including on potential new
SEC disclosure requirements, potential new disclosure frameworks that the
Commission might adopt or incorporate in its disclosure rules, and how the
Commission could best regulate climate change disclosures going forward.
The record in response to this call for comments lists a number of meetings
in response to the SEC’s March request for comments, including with the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, State Street Global Advisors, the Business
Roundtable, the Edison Electric Institute, and Walmart. The new Chair of the
SEC, Gary Gensler, during his March Senate Banking Committee
confirmation hearing, reinforced expectations that his agenda as the next SEC
chairman will focus heavily on environmental, social, and governance (ESG)
issues. During the hearing, Gensler also voiced support for new climate risk
disclosure rules in response to questions from Sen. Sherrod Brown of Ohio,
the panel’s chairman, stating, “I think issuers would benefit from such
guidance, so I think through good economic analysis, working with the staff,
putting out to the public to get public feedback on this, this is something that
the commission, if I’m confirmed, I’d work on.”222 The agency is focusing
its attention on climate-related disclosures and considering its regulatory
options.
The SEC has received over 6,000 public comments in response to this
latest call, including almost 600 unique comments.223 Most of the comments
disclosure [https://perma.cc/QG8D-RLPX].
220
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221
Lee, supra note 48.
222
Bill Flook, At Senate Hearing, SEC Nominee Gensler Signals Support for Climate
Risk, Political Spending Disclosure Rules, THOMSON REUTERS (Mar. 3, 2021),
https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/news/at-senate-hearing-sec-nominee-gensler-signalssupport-for-climate-risk-political-spending-disclosure-rules/
[https://perma.cc/3TQ6MSPD].
223
As of Jul. 13, 2021. For a copy of comments received and list of SEC meetings with
key stakeholders see: Comments on Climate Change Disclosures, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N., https://www.sec.gov/comments/climate-disclosure/cll12.htm [https://perma.cc/

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3952915

48

THE SEC AND CLIMATE RISK

[8-Mar-22

submitted by large corporations, associations, and non-government
organizations generally support efforts by the SEC to establish climate
change and ESG reporting standards, with widespread support for
incorporating existing international frameworks into the new reporting
standards, in particular those developed by the Task Force on Climate-related
Financial Disclosures (TCFD) and the Sustainability Accounting Standards
Board (SASB). Those in support of new climate and ESG standards and
frameworks include large petroleum companies Chevron and
ConocoPhillips, the American Gas Association, large financial institutions,
investor groups, associations such as the National Manufacturers
Association, and technology giants Apple, Amazon, and Google.
The key difference between the comments in support is whether the
SEC should mandate disclosure of specific climate metrics and targets under
Regulation S-K, or if it should instead continue to apply a principles-based
approach to disclosure, allowing companies the flexibility to decide what
climate-related information to disclose, through furnished reports rather than
filed disclosure statements. Of the comments supporting mandatory rules,
most called for a requirement for disclosure of Scope 1, 2, and 3 greenhouse
gas emissions from across each company’s entire value chain. 224 Comments
from large financial players, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the
American Bankers Association, and Deutsche Bank, opposed prescriptive
disclosure requirements, highlighting the longstanding materiality standard
for corporate disclosure as well as the “variability of investor interest and
issuer practices across industries and companies.”225
A similar approach was taken by Amazon, which was joined by a
group of technology companies, including Google’s parent company
Alphabet, as well as Facebook, and Salesforce. Their joint comment argues
for the SEC to adopt a flexible principles-based disclosure framework and
FCJ7-8EEK].
224
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[https://perma.cc/YF3G-AYUP]; Arvin Ganesan, Glob. Energy & Env’t Pol’y, Apple,
Comment Letter in Response to Request for Information on Climate Change Disclosures
(Jun. 11, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/comments/ climate-disclosure/cll12-8915594244828.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CNE-TR9P].
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Head of Regul. Affs. - Ams., Deutsche Bank AG, Comment Letter in Response to Request
for
Information
on
Climate
Change
Disclosures
(Jun.
11,
2021),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/climate-disclosure/cll12-8906897-244213.pdf
[https://perma.cc/86AA-NRRS].

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3952915

8-Mar-22]

THE SEC AND CLIMATE RISK

49

indicates support for disclosures to include greenhouse gas emissions
information, but it does not suggest that such disclosures be mandatory.226
Departing from Amazon and Google, Apple submitted its own
comment, stating that the principles-based approach does not go far enough
in the fight against climate change, advocating instead for mandatory
reporting rules requiring issuers to measure and disclose third-party-reviewed
emissions data from the company’s entire value chain, as recommended by
the TCFD.227 Global asset management firm BlackRock also called for
mandatory rulemaking in line with the TCFD framework, including
“qualitative and quantitative disclosure items modeled on those of the TCFD
framework, as well as sector-specific metrics, such as those identified by
SASB”.228 Ceres, a nonprofit organization working in climate change and
investing, together with over 500 investor groups, companies, non-profit
organizations, and individuals, prepared a joint comment generally in line
with the comment from BlackRock, calling for mandatory disclosure rules
that align with the TFCD framework and with industry-specific metrics and
quantitative disclosure of Scope 1, 2, and 3 greenhouse gas emissions.229
Ceres also submitted an individual comment setting out detailed responses to
each of the SEC’s fifteen questions, noting in particular that climate change
risks permeate all aspects of capital markets, notwithstanding issuer size or
sector, and that consistent, comparable climate change disclosure is critical
to the SEC’s mission to protect investors, to maintain fair, orderly, and
efficient markets, and to facilitate capital formation.230
Two comments actively opposed any new rulemaking on climate or
ESG issues. The National Mining Association submitted a comment that
argues against any change to the current disclosure regime, stating that it is
premature for the SEC to move forward with rulemaking to incorporate
mandatory climate-related risk disclosures without first completing an
assessment of the effectiveness of its 2010 guidance. The National Mining
226
Alphabet Inc. et al., Comment Letter in Response to Request for Information on
Climate Change Disclosures (Jun. 11, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/ comments/climatedisclosure/cll12-8907252-244227.pdf [https://perma.cc/SS2Z-VXPX].
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Association also warned that the SEC must “avoid disclosure obligations
designed to further specific policy goals outside of the SEC’s tripartite
mission”. 231 The NMA comment concludes that “[t]he SEC does not have
the expertise or authority to make policy decisions about climate change, nor
the authority to expand the public company disclosure obligations beyond the
Commission’s mission to ensure that public companies convey material
information to investors.”
The other comment actively opposed to new rulemaking came from
the American Petroleum Institute (API), the largest U.S. trade association for
the oil and gas industry in the U.S., which foreshadowed a number of
constitutional challenges to any new rules that would require mandatory
climate disclosures, including through the incorporation of an international
standard created by a private party such as the TFCD. 232 The API argues that
“debate persists about whether this type of nonfinancial reporting is
material,” and that “the materiality of any particular climate-related statement
remains very much a case-by-case inquiry, focused on the statements a
particular issuer provided in the context of the ‘total-mix’ of information
available to reasonable investors about that issuer.” The API warns that if the
SEC seeks to impose a “major new climate disclosure regime” that deviates
from the materiality requirement without “clear congressional command,” it
may raise “significant concern about whether the SEC has strayed far beyond
its authority to regulate the securities markets,” and additionally “could raise
serious First Amendment issues under recent precedent applying strict
scrutiny to content-based laws compelling speech.”
The API also argues that courts would not defer to the SEC’s
interpretation of its authority on the basis that rulemaking on disclosures of
this kind would be considered issues of “vast ‘economic and political
significance’” under the “major questions” doctrine, and refers specifically
to recent Supreme Court decisions creating exceptions to the Chevron
doctrine as discussed above. Finally, the API comment includes a warning
against requiring companies to comply with a privately-developed disclosure
framework, such as the TCFD, arguing that “neither Congress nor an agency
may delegate to private entities unfettered power to establish the content of
regulatory requirements that are binding upon third parties.”
While political infeasibility and agency inertia on the issue of climate231
Tawny Bridgeford, Deputy Gen. Couns. & Vice President, Regul. Affs., Nat’l Mining
Ass’n, Comment Letter in Response to Request for Information on Climate Change
Disclosures (Jun. 11, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/comments/climate-disclosure/cll128911809-244413.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4KR-GH8M].
232
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related disclosures may have dissolved, these latter comments in particular
illustrate that business resistance by some market actors will remain an
important factor for the agency to consider as it moves forward with its
regulatory agenda. Some resistance by highly exposed industries can be
expected. Despite this resistance, disclosure is considered to be the linchpin
of fair, transparent, and well-functioning markets, and it is central to the
mandate of the SEC. The following section weighs the risks and benefits of
rulemaking in this area by the SEC.

IV. THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF RULEMAKING ON CLIMATE DISCLOSURES
As illustrated above, issuers may be resistant to any rule issued by the
SEC mandating climate-related disclosures, and this resistance is likely to
transform into a litigation challenge to any SEC rulemaking. While the
agency could (and should) update and enforce its 2010 guidance, a regulation
mandating uniform disclosures would be most useful for investors despite the
litigation risks. Judicial hostility to agency rulemaking is likely to involve
questions regarding cost-benefit analysis conducted by the agency. While the
SEC is an independent agency and not subject to the full extent of Executive
Order 12,866—which requires an OIRA review of a proposed rule233—it is
subject to the Regulatory Flexibility Act 1980 and Paperwork Reduction Act
1995. Both statutes require an assessment of how new rules affect small
businesses. In addition, the National Securities Market Improvement Act
(NSMIA) requires the SEC consider a proposed rule’s effect on “efficiency,
competition and capital formation.”234 In the 1990s, a series of controversial
D.C. Circuit decisions began interpreting this requirement in NSMIA as
requiring quantified cost-benefit analysis by the SEC.235
In a series of cases brought by trade associations such as the Business
Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, issuers challenged the costbenefit analyses (or lack thereof) conducted by the SEC.236 The rules at issue
varied from shareholder-nominated proxy disclosures to rules barring
national security exchanges from listing stock that restricted per share voting
233

See Datla & Revesz, supra note 59 at 773 (stating Presidential authority to require
independent agencies to submit regulations to OIRA for review remains an open question).
234
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110
Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2006)), § 106.
235
Jeff Schwartz & Alexandrea Nelson, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Conflict Minerals
Rule, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 287, 299 (2016).
236
See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Chamber of Commerce
of U.S. v. SEC (Chamber of Commerce I), 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Chamber of
Commerce of U.S. v. SEC (Chamber of Commerce II), 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Bus.
Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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rights of individual shareholders. In some of these decisions, the SEC rule
was found to have violated the APA for failing to adequately consider costs
imposed on issuers of the rules237 or for reliance on extra-record data that was
found to be more than supplementary.238
In the most recent case in this line of decisions, the SEC was found to
have acted arbitrarily and capriciously by not evaluating the costs that could
be imposed on issuers by the rule.239 The Court found the SEC had failed to
appraise itself of economic consequences of the proposed regulation.240 In
strong language, the court accused the agency of “inconsistently and
opportunistically” framing the costs and benefits of the rule but failing to
quantify certain costs or explain why those costs could not be quantified.241
This series of cases was not relied upon in the NAM Conflict Minerals
case (covered above), and the cost-benefit analysis involved in the conflict
minerals rule has been severely critiqued; however these cases, and the
requirement for conducting robust cost-benefit analysis, may still pose
obstacles to the SEC.242 In response to these cases, the SEC has put in place
a rigorous cost-benefit analysis procedure via the Division of Economic and
Risk Analysis (DERA) within the agency.243 This section charts some of the
risks and benefits of rulemaking in light of these judicial decisions. It also
provides some recommendations as to how the SEC could craft a rule that
avoids, or at least mitigates, the barriers previously identified.

A. The risks and benefits of rulemaking
While both the political and investment landscapes have shifted
dramatically in favor of SEC action on climate-related disclosures, and the
agency itself is seriously considering regulatory action, considerable
obstacles remain. Judicial resistance to independent agencies generally, and
to rulemaking by the SEC without a cost-benefit analysis specifically, is on
the rise. Many of these developments are beyond the control of the agency.
Issuer resistance to a climate-disclosure rule is likely to trigger judicial
237

See Chamber of Commerce I, 412 F.3d at 143.
See Chamber of Commerce II, 443 F.3d at 908.
239
Bus. Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C.
Cir. 2011).
240
Id. at 1149.
241
Id.
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Schwartz & Nelson, supra note 230, at 300 (finding the SEC’s assessment of benefits
pithy and critiquing the court’s reliance on cost-benefit analysis conducted by issuers as well,
partly due to the impossibility of assessing humanitarian benefits such as avoidance of rape
in cost-benefit analysis).
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review. So, even as an independent agency, the SEC will have to navigate
both political and investor enthusiasm, as well as issuer and judicial hostility
when taking any agency action on climate-related financial disclosures.
Resistance to rulemaking is likely to focus on three issues. The first is that
the existing mandate of the SEC does not provide it with sufficient flexibility
to mandate climate-related disclosures from industry. The second is that the
costs of disclosure significantly outweigh the benefits of rulemaking. And
third is that any mandated disclosure violates the First Amendment.
In terms of the first argument, the SEC mandate, it is clear that the agency
enjoys a broad mandate to require disclosure. Climate related disclosures
would squarely fall within the agency’s mandate as they are so closely related
to protecting the investing public, promoting market efficiency and
preserving U.S. market competitiveness. But even if Congress eventually
mandates the SEC to require climate-related disclosures,244 as evidenced in
the conflict minerals rule, the agency will still have to convince some
business and judicial actors of the relevance of climate disclosures to its
investor protection mandate. The systemic nature of climate risks to the
financial system at large can help the agency navigate this particular
objection. Systemic risks will affect investors, as many investors will not be
able to diversify away from these risks. Systemic risk mitigation is not just a
prudential issue, but it is also a market-based issue; therefore, disclosure rules
are firmly tied to the investor protection mandate of the SEC.
Many industry actors, and at times the SEC itself, have taken a narrow

244

There have been a number of legislative attempts at this over the years, including in
2021. The Climate Risk Disclosure Act was introduced in both chambers during the
116th Congress, and in the Senate during the 115th Congress, but died with both
legislative sessions. These efforts were revived in 2021 with the change of
administration. On February 25th, 2021, the House Committee on Financial Service’s
Subcommittee on Investor Protection, Entrepreneurship and Capital Markets held a
hearing to discuss the 2021 iteration of the Climate Risk Disclosure Act. The bill is
designed to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) to require
issuers to disclose various climate-related risks in SEC filings, and would require the
SEC to adopt rules mandating other climate-related disclosures. Another legislative
option is the Paris Climate Agreement Disclosure Act, which would amend the
Exchange Act to require disclosures related to the Paris Agreement, including a
requirement to issue a statement as to why and whether it supports the Agreement’s
temperature goals. A month later, in March 2021, the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce proposed the Climate Leadership and Environmental Action for our Nation’s
Future Act (CLEAN Future Act), which would amend the Exchange Act to require that
the SEC promulgate rules requiring public companies to disclose information including
direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions of the issuer and its affiliates, fossil fuelrelated assets owned or managed by the issuer, and climate-related risk disclosures by
industry or sector. It is unclear where these legislative attempts will lead, but legislating
for climate-related disclosures is not a likely outcome, see Myers, supra note 104.
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view of the agency’s mandate.245 Certain SEC Commissioners are likely to
resist mandating specialized disclosures, and Commissioner Roisman has
already expressed concern regarding the proposed disclosure rule. SEC
Commissioner opinions are often adopted by courts, and this was the case in
the D.C. Circuit decisions covered above. In June 2021, Commissioner
Roisman raised several questions that the SEC will have to consider if it
moves forward with further ESG disclosure, particularly if the agency
requires more prescriptive disclosures. He stated that investor requests for
more disclosure would require issuers to provide information that “is
inherently imprecise, relies on underlying assumptions that continually
evolve, and can be reasonably calculated in different ways.”246 While some
climate data is imprecise, most of it is not. However, this argument illustrates
that whether the SEC mandate can require this type of disclosure will be a
live issue in any review. Rules that cater to this evolution of climate-related
financial risks would address these concerns.
Any judicial scrutiny may be particularly focused on whether the SEC
has the statutory mandate to require climate related disclosures. Broad social
protection mandates, even if required by Congress, proved detrimental in the
conflict minerals rule as the judiciary expressed some skepticism whether
these protective mandates fell within the mandate of the SEC. In addition, the
inability (or rather impossibility) of the agency to develop quantified benefits
for the rule also aided its demise. While regulating climate disclosures is
much closer to the statutory mandate of the SEC of investor protection than
the conflict minerals rule was, the agency should make every effort to
demonstrate, in a quantified manner, both the costs but also the benefits of
such a rule to issuers and investors alike.
There are benefits to rulemaking on climate disclosures. The existing
materiality principle is confusing, and there is no bright line or strict
percentage approach an issuer can adopt to determine whether a risk is
material.247 A determination of materiality is up to the issuer to determine,
and this contributes to vague and sparsely worded disclosures. Uniform,
mandatory, and precise disclosure rules would alleviate this confusion and
provide clearer and uniform criteria for issuers to adopt when disclosing
climate-related financial risks.
Existing sustainability disclosures are also fragmented.248 Voluntary
245

Williams & Nagy, supra note 4, at 1456.
Elad L. Roisman, Comm’r, Putting the Electric Cart before the Horse: Addressing
Inevitable Costs of a New ESG Disclosure Regime, Speech at the ESG Board Forum,
Washington D.C., (June 3, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/roisman-esg-2021-0603 [https://perma.cc/6Y98-4EDV].
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disclosures tend to be vague, general, or full of boilerplate statements that are
not useful for investors.249 Firms use a variety of different metrics in their
disclosures, particularly in their disclosures of CO2 emissions.250 This means
that disclosures are not comparable either between firms or between
subsequent disclosures by the same firm. Mandatory and prescriptive
elements of a rule issued by the SEC would overcome this fragmentation—
and require a minimum standard of disclosures—with specified metrics that
issuers could adopt and investors could easily compare. This would provide
a level of uniformity and consistency to disclosures that would make them
decision-useful for investors. Mandatory disclosure rules can promote
investor protection and improve market efficiency by improving the accuracy
of share prices, which can boost investor confidence.251 These benefits reduce
exposures to systemic risks to investors and issuers and promote efficiency
and capital formation.
The SEC is already experienced in managing a transparency framework
for securities. Transparency is inherent in federal securities law, and so the
SEC can quickly and effectively regulate systemic risk.252 Cary Martin
Shelby, a prominent academic in corporate and securities law, argues in the
context of hedge funds, that the SEC may be a better regulator of systemic
risk than prudential regulators.253 Shelby recommends that the SEC establish
a new division dedicated to mitigating systemic risks and add a stress-test
regime in the hedge fund context,254 but this could also apply to a climate
disclosure regime. The existing expertise of the SEC in mandating and
monitoring disclosures make it a prime agency to regulate and monitor
climate-related financial risks. Ann Lipton, an experienced corporate and
securities litigator, argues that disclosure advances the mandate of the SEC
in a number of ways, namely by preventing fraud and allowing investors to
compare opportunities, and leads to more efficient allocation of capital.255
Disclosure can also shape the behavior of corporate managers and discipline
managerial misconduct.256 Disclosure can benefit investors, capital markets,
suitable to investment analysis).
249
Fisch, supra note 5, at 948.
250
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 2, at 32.
251
Cary Martin Shelby, Closing the Hedge Fund Loophole: the SEC as the Primary
Regulator of Systemic Risk 58 B. C. L. REV. 639, 683 (2017).
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Id. at 641; Quinn Emanuel and Martin, SEC Financial Disclosures: Will New Rules
Come With a New President? (17 Dec, 2020).
253
Id. at 641–42. (arguing that the blurred distinction between investors and banks due
to more flexible and exotic financial instruments has heightened the systemic risks to
investors who can no longer absorb losses).
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Id. at 649.
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and firms. It can provide benefits to actors in financial markets, and forms a
core part of the agency’s mandate. Both the costs and benefits of disclosure
rules should be explicitly assessed by the SEC when taking agency action.
B. Cost-benefit analysis
While the SEC could rely on easier regulatory routes such as updating
and enforcing its 2010 guidance and/or revising its no-action review process
to avoid regulatory obstacles to shareholder proposals on climate disclosures,
it is likely to issue a rule and not just standards in order to ensure consistency
of disclosure and to avoid greenwashing.257 A rule that fits easily within the
existing mandate of an agency, such as the SEC, would be more feasible, but
it would still face obstacles. An explicit cost-benefit analysis conducted by
the agency will help to mitigate some of these obstacles. There are, of course,
drawbacks to this approach. Conducting rigorous cost-benefit analyses takes
time, energy, and expertise. Conducting these analyses also drains the
resources of the agency and diverts attention away from other regulatory
exercises. Donna Nagy, an author of several books on securities regulation,
litigation and enforcement, notes how in the past, mandated cost-benefit
analyses have stymied the SEC’s regulatory agenda. 258 They are also
necessarily incomplete and will be challenging to put together in the context
of climate-related risks, which are constantly evolving. Despite these
drawbacks, the SEC should undertake such an exercise if a rule on climaterelated financial disclosures is promulgated.
While a rigorous cost-benefit analysis conducted by the agency will
prolong any rulemaking process and will be difficult to conduct due to
inherent uncertainties in the nature and extent of climate risks, this exercise
will be critical to avoiding judicial hostility to the SEC rulemaking more
broadly, and specifically to its statutory mandate to require climate-related
disclosures.259 The process, already implemented by DERA at the SEC, is
critical and any analysis should be robust and explicit. The DERA process
includes cost-benefit analysis as one of its four requirements of economic
analysis of proposed rules. Including explicit and detailed explanations of
where and why costs and/or benefits cannot be quantified will be critically
important, considering the series of cases brought by NAM, the Business
257
Brett McDonnell et al., Green Boardrooms?, 53 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 72), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3569303.
258
Donna M. Nagy, The Costs of Mandatory Cost-Benefit Analysis in SEC Rulemaking,
57 ARIZ. L. REV. 129 (2015).
259
Although the imposition of cost-benefit analysis on the SEC by the D.C. Circuit is
contested, see id. at 130 (illustrating that the SEC has already incorporated a robust internal
process of cost-benefit analysis as a result of these rulings).
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Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in the past. In fact, attempts
during the Trump Administration to undo Obama era regulations were largely
unsuccessful in the courts precisely because those Obama regulations were
supported by high quality cost-benefit analysis.260
The costs of high-quality disclosures could be significant, particularly for
larger firms. Maintaining the status quo and relying on voluntary standardsetting agencies may avoid some direct costs to firms, and to the SEC of
auditing those disclosures, but it should be highlighted that the current
voluntary reporting system is also costly.261 Producing voluntary reports is
already an expensive endeavour, and many firms are already producing these
and publishing them on their websites and many have done so for decades.
Lack of uniform standards when producing these reports increases their
costs—and their inaccuracies—so the utility of publishing voluntary reports
without uniform criteria or metrics is questionable. There are also indirect
competitive costs of disclosing information, which may be harmful to firms,
but confidentiality provisions or restricting disclosures to existing investors
could account for these costs.
The costs of preparing disclosures should be balanced against existing
costs imposed on investors as well as on issuers. Investors currently have to
rely on private ordering mechanisms in order to obtain climate-related risks.
These include combing through vague and potentially inaccurate voluntary
sustainability reports, as well as reports sent by issuers to private standardsetting agencies. Investors have to spend time and resources distilling
information that is material from these reports, instead of being provided with
accurate, high quality, consistent, and comparable information in financial
reports.262 The proliferation of voluntary ESG, including climate-related
disclosures, is already drowning investors with information that lacks clarity
and comparability, thus necessitating greater standardization.263
In addition, investors have to engage in disaggregated individualized
efforts by engaging in shareholder proxy contents, such as the Engine No. 1
exercise, submitting non-binding shareholder proposals, or engaging directly
with firms to request climate-specific risk information. The 2020 GAO report
illustrates that institutional investors regularly have to purchase data from
third party aggregators and/or engage with issuers in order to supplement
gaps and inconsistencies in existing disclosures.264 These investors report that
engagement with issuers can be complicated by conflicting investor demands
260

Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Chevronizing Around Cost-Benefit Analysis, 70
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as well as the sheer proliferation of standards and surveys.265 A large number
of demands from investors can also prove challenging to issuers as well as
they struggle to prioritize how to respond to them.266 These exercises are
costly to investors and to issuers. The lack of detail in the SEC 2010 guidance
is also costly to issuers, as they have to make their own decisions about what
might be covered by the guidance, particularly issuers that choose to disclose
climate-related risks.267
This lack of uniformity is costly to the SEC as well. As Harper Ho notes,
this system requires SEC staff to conduct no-action reviews of shareholder
proposals and can cause reputational damage to the agency itself.268 This
information asymmetry is costly, inefficient, and detrimental to the smooth,
transparent, and fair functioning of capital markets. Therefore, the costs to
investors, issuers, and capital markets should also be included in any costbenefit analysis undertaken by the SEC.
The direct and ancillary benefits of rulemaking on climate-related
disclosures should also be included. Direct benefits include the reduction of
costs to issuers and investors as illustrated above by the adoption of uniform
and methodologically consistent disclosure requirements and a more
informed and therefore efficient allocation of capital. As Jack Lienke and
Alexander Song note, the SEC may rely on purely qualitative assessments of
some effects in order to support a conclusion that a climate risk disclosure
rule is cost-benefit justified.269 In addition to direct benefits, ancillary benefits
can be included in a cost-benefit analysis which go beyond direct benefits to
capital markets. While these ancillary benefits cannot be excessively
attenuated, there should be parity in treatment of both countervailing costs
and ancillary benefits.270 As Revesz and Livermore note, there has been a
historical bias in agencies accepting industry estimates of costs of complying
with new regulation, because industry has an incentive to overestimate the
costs of complying with regulations they do not like, and a disincentive to
invest in forecasting the scale and pace of technological developments which
might lead to more accurate cost-benefit analysis.271 Efficient regulations
deliver social welfare and market-based benefits, and counteract failures of
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an unregulated market.272 Therefore the SEC should carefully balance both
the cost and benefits, including distributional benefits, of regulating in this
area even where those benefits might be difficult to estimate.
C. Constitutional issues
While the previous Conflict Minerals decision focused on First
Amendment and compelled speech issues, it may also have implications for
judicial approaches to any climate disclosures rule. While any rule on
climate-related disclosures is unlikely to require a moral “climate compliant”
notice on an issuer’s website—and so is unlikely to invoke the same level of
ire as the requirement for the conflict-free minerals statement did—it is likely
that at least some issuers will allege constitutional violations, particularly if
the benefits to investors are not ascertainable and identifiable by the agency.
For example, the API’s responses to the SEC calls for input in 2021 warns
that if the SEC issues a rule without a statutory mandate to do so, it may not
only exceed its mandate but may also raise First Amendment issues, and the
API cites compelled speech laws in particular. These allegations take on new
weight as a result of the recent Supreme Court decision in AFPF v Bonta,
which evidenced increasing judicial hostility to disclosure regimes.
The Conflict Minerals decision will be instructive in this type of
challenge, but must be considered in light of the new AFPF v Bonta case. In
the Conflict Minerals decision, the Court considered the two-step test in
Zauderer case273 as an alternative ground for its decision. Step one of the test
272

Id., at 155.
Zauderer v. Office of Disc. Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) cited in NAM III, 800 F.3d
518; but see, e.g., Lucien J. Dhooge, The First Amendment and Disclosure Regulations:
Compelled Speech or Corporate Opportunism 51 AM. BUS. L. J. (2014) 599, 641 (stating the
application of Zauderer outside of consumer protection issues is questionable), the
intermediate scrutiny test under Central Hudson may be harder for the SEC to meet, but a
focus on listener-rights tied to its statutory investor protection mandate would be critical in
that instance, see infra IV.D.. See also Sarah Haan, The Post-Truth First Amendment 94
INDIANA L. R. (2019) 1351, 1377 (noting the emphasis in Zauderer by courts on ‘factual and
uncontroversial’ nature of the information which the Government is compelling disclosure
of, which leads to preference, in First Amendment cases of a higher test for compelling socalled ‘controversial’ information, making that information harder to wrest from wealthy,
powerful speakers such as corporations). As applied in the NAM case, the D.C. Circuit’s
approach to the Zauderer ‘uncontroversial’ test was that it could not draw a bright line
between facts and opinions, as these two are often blurred. Haan notes this conflation of fact
and opinion by courts and a broad interpretation of ‘controversial’ topics can lead to a posttruth information economy where both facts and opinion have equal weight (id., at 1383).
Climate change has already been dubbed a ‘controversial’ issue, along with sexual
orientation, gender identity and evolution, by Justice Alito in a majority opinion of the
Supreme Court, see Janus v AFSCME 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2476 (2018). Applying such a
conflated approach to facts and opinions in the disclosure regime of the SEC could unpick
273
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in Zauderer, as elucidated in AMI, requires the identification and assessment
of the adequacy of government interest motivating the disclosure requirement
by businesses. In the Conflict Minerals case, the Court accepted the SEC’s
description of the government’s interest to be the amelioration of the
humanitarian crisis in the DRC, and it deemed this to be a sufficient interest.
If the SEC can tie domestic action on climate disclosures to reduction of costs
and an increase in benefits for U.S. issuers, as well as illustrate the escalating
risks of climate change to the U.S. financial system, then it is likely to
demonstrate sufficient government interest in the issue.
Step two of Zauderer requires an evaluation of the effectiveness of the
measure in achieving the stated aim. In the Conflict Minerals case, the Court
found there was a lack of evidence regarding the benefits of the rule, meaning
the rule failed step two. The Court was particularly troubled by two issues in
step two. First, that the benefits cited were purely speculative compared to
the high level of costs involved.274 In particular, evidence to the contrary—
that forced disclosure would in fact lead to economic impairment of miners
in the DRC—meant the court was unconvinced of the effectiveness of the
proposed measure. The SEC had the burden, under step two, to demonstrate
the measure it adopted would in fact alleviate the alleged harm to a material
degree.275 This could be a risk in any judicial review of climate disclosure
rules. In the climate disclosure context, it will be critically important for the
SEC to demonstrate how disclosure can alleviate the financial risks of climate
change to investors in particular. Evidence of the systemic nature of climate
risks, combined with benefits to investors of regulated disclosures, must be
expressly quantified and articulated.
The second issue of particular concern in the Conflict Minerals case was
the part of the rule that required issuers to publicly tell their consumers on
their website that their products were ethically tainted276 with no concrete
evidence of the benefits of the rule. There is unlikely to be any requirement
in a climate disclosure rule of a public notice of compliance on an issuer’s
website. Compliance will be dealt with internally by the SEC, as is
compliance with any regulatory requirement on financial filings, so this
element of the case is less of a concern. However, in order to account for
constitutional issues such as these, it will also be important for the SEC to
build in some flexibility into its rules.
The recent AFPF v Bonta case, however, evidences a high level of
skepticism by the Supreme Court to disclosure regimes, at least in the non
the delicate fabric of securities disclosures established since the 1930s, which underpins the
entire securities regime.
274
NAM III, 800 F.3d at 525.
275
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profit sector, and imposes a higher level of judicial scrutiny to First
Amendment claims concerning disclosure regimes generally.277 In AFPF v.
Bonta, the Americans for Prosperity Foundation challenged California’s
requirement for charitable organizations to identify their top donors. The
purpose of the disclosure regime was to help the Attorney General to police
against charitable frauds and abuses but AFPF claimed that disclosure of
donor names may lead to leaks, which would intimidate donors’ giving or
even threaten their security. However, AFPF provided no evidence that had
actually happened.
Despite this lack of concrete evidence of harm, Chief Justice Robert’s
majority opinion applied an exacting scrutiny test as a one-size-fits all
standard. While this case applied to charitable organizations, his opinion
attempted to apply this standard for all laws governing compelled disclosure
by organizations. Under that standard, there must be a “substantial relation
between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important
governmental interest.”278 The “exacting scrutiny” standard does not require
the disclosure regimes be the least restrictive means of achieving their ends,
but does require disclosure regimes be narrowly tailored to the Government’s
asserted interests. As California was unlikely to rely on these disclosures for
enforcement purposes, Roberts held the government interest at stake was
purely administrative convenience, and so did not reflect the seriousness of
the actual burden on First Amendment rights.
The conservative majority on the court was not all in agreement with the
application of the exacting scrutiny standard. Justice Thomas’ concurring
opinion diverged from the majority opinion by advocating for a strict scrutiny
test instead, with Justices Alito and Gorsuch eschewing a one-size-fits all
standard. However, as Haan and Stevelman note, Alito and Gorsuch like the
strict scrutiny test. According to Haan and Stevenlman, the AFPF decision
undermines the authority of state governments to create a record of people
and organizations that shape major political initiatives and influence political
actors.279 The Americans For Prosperity Foundation has strong links with
influential fossil-fuel billionaire conservative, Charles Koch.280 Therefore, it
makes sense why the API raised First Amendment challenges in their
comment to the 2021 SEC call for comments on climate-related disclosure
rules. The Supreme Court’s new and more skeptical approach to disclosure
277
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regimes, while applied in the nonprofit context, is likely to be applied beyond
this area,281 and therefore could form part of a challenge to any SEC rules on
climate-related disclousres.
D. Flexible but firm rules
Climate-related disclosures are complex. The SEC could respond to this
complexity by mandating a mixture of both principles-based and more
prescriptive, line-item based disclosure requirements, allowing enough
prescription for investors to be able to easily discern and compare climate
risks while also providing sufficient flexibility for issuers to learn-bydisclosing and to ramp up their disclosures—and the specificity of their
disclosures—over time. This more flexible approach is likely to reduce
business resistance and judicial hostility to the rule.282 It may also conform
more easily to the ‘exacting scrutiny’ test applied in AFPF v Bonta, which
requires that rules be tailored to only target the problem or government
interest at stake.283 Rules-based disclosures could be line-item based where
risks are more clearly delineated, such as the physical risks of climate change
to corporate assets. Rules could prescriptively require disclosure of the
location of firm assets, and estimates of the physical risks to those assets.
These line-item disclosures could specify which scenario analysis firms could
and should use to estimate physical risks, thereby providing some uniformity
and consistency to the disclosures.
Rules could be principle-based where risks, such as transition risks, are
less clear and more difficult to estimate and measure. These principles-based
rules could be supplemented by guidance issued by the agency, and this
guidance could be updated periodically over time to take into account new
and evolving climate and climate-risk related projections and regulatory
developments. In addition, disclosure requirements could be more robust for
highly exposed industries, sectors, and firms, and less so for smaller, less
exposed firms, sectors, and industries.
Sector specific guidance is also very useful, and the TCFD has already
begun to develop these in other areas of disclosures. The SEC already
provides Industry Guides to specific sectors such as the mining and oil and
gas industry. SEC rules could adhere to the general tenets of internationally
based guidance and recommendations, such as from the TCFD and SASB, to
281
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ensure international coherence but allow for some firm flexibility. SEC rules
could be more detailed and specified for certain industries, making them
context- and industry-specific and also in line with international standards.
Many investors and issuers will want and benefit from domestic regulation,
which is consistent with existing international approaches to disclosure. This
will be particularly beneficial for issuers that operate across jurisdictions.
This cohesiveness will not only make it easier for issuers to create
standardized and uniform disclosures in various jurisdictions, but it would
also significantly reduce the costs of preparing and duplicating these
disclosures.
The TCFD has quickly emerged as the international leader in climate
disclosures, and its recommendations focus on four core areas, which mirror
core areas of organizational management: governance, strategy, risk
management and metrics, and targets. SEC rules could be framed around
these four areas to provide overall consistency with international guidelines.
SEC rules could deviate from detailed TCFD guidance where the agency
feels those deviations are essential and jurisdiction-specific. TCFD
recommendations are also not speculative, a frequent critique made by those
opposed to mandatory regulations. Instead, the TCFD guidance focuses on
how companies are approaching climate risks and opportunities today.284
Aligning U.S. regulatory approaches with international governance
initiatives is in line with the new Administration’s approaches to climate risk.
It also protects the institutional legitimacy of the SEC itself.285 Securities
regulators in many industrialized countries have either endorsed or
implemented ESG and climate reporting,286 and some have even
implemented mandatory climate risk disclosures.
Related to the costs of rulemaking is the issue (both financially and also
technically) of the costs of complying with mandatory rules for smaller
companies. Commissioner Roisman’s speech provides suggestions for
reducing the costs of any new disclosure requirements by providing more
scaled disclosure regimes. He suggests providing more flexibility to small or
fledgling public issuers, as well as extended implementation periods.287
Incorporating such flexibility into a rulemaking process can help alleviate
costs concerns, particularly for smaller or less exposed issuers. Providing
flexibility to smaller issuers and a phased-in process for these companies with
extended implementation periods, particularly in less exposed sectors, will
help alleviate the costs of regulation. In this interim period of flexibility for
smaller or less exposed firms, the agency could also adopt a comply-or284
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explain approach, allowing firms to state whether a certain disclosure applies
to their business, and if not, to explain why.288 The SEC should conduct audits
of disclosures, particularly for large or highly exposed industries. But audits
could similarly be phased in for smaller or less exposed industries.
The flexibility of rules cuts both ways. Climate science and the risks of
climate change are ever evolving, and so the approach adopted by the SEC to
require climate-related disclosures should fold flexibility into its
requirements for firms to cater to this evolution; therefore, large or highly
exposed industries should be required to continually assess the risks of
climate change to their businesses. These disclosures should be upgraded
over time as the scientific data regarding physical risks becomes more
accurate and transition risks evolve. The periodicity of updates to disclosures
could be longer for smaller or less exposed industries or issuers.
There are some drawbacks to rulemaking on climate-related disclosures.
Not only is it a time-consuming exercise, but due to the complexity of climate
science, the SEC will have to hire more climate experts to be able to
appropriately assess the disclosures firms make in response to any rules or
guidance.289 But the SEC is used to assessing complex information and
already has a diversity of expertise across economics and finance, and so it is
well placed to manage this complexity. The SEC, as a member of the FSB,
was also a contributor to the TCFD guidance from the outset, and so has
experience with this regime already. Issuers will also have to hire climate
experts to their boards or to subcommittees of boards to be able to comply
with any SEC rule.290 Issuers such as Amazon and Shell, which have already
announced net-zero emissions goals, will already be doing this. But even
issuers such as ExxonMobil and Chevron, which have not announced netzero ambitions or have only recently done so, are being forced to add climate
expertise on to their boards by their existing shareholders.291
Despite the drawbacks, the benefits of regulatory action by the SEC
outweigh the risks. A mandatory but flexible SEC rule on climate-related
financial disclosures will ensure that issuer disclosures are uniform, of
consistent quality, and comparable. The SEC can also help ensure that
investor-based climate action is not entirely unilateral and fragmented, and
this more consistent and predictable system would be beneficial for investors,
firms, and capital markets. A phased and stable transition of firms and capital
288
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away from fossil fuels and towards climate-friendly investments is essential,
and uniform SEC rules on climate-related disclosures can help make a stable
and phased transition a reality and mitigate the escalation of climate-related
risks into systemic, unmanageable risks.

CONCLUSION
The time has never been better for the SEC to regulate climate-related
financial disclosures. The agency is willing, and the political climate is ripe
for such a change. Institutional investors are demanding such disclosures
from public corporations, as the risks of climate change are escalating in
severity and frequency. The SEC, as an independent agency, is in a prime
position to measure and consider the level and type of climate-related
disclosures that should be imposed on issuers in order to protect investors.
Despite this shifting landscape, business and judicial resistance remain
potential obstacles. This article recommends that the SEC consider its past
failures in mandating disclosures, and that these failures inform its
approaches going forward. This article recommends the inclusion of robust
and quantified cost-benefit analyses, as well as a flexible but firm regulatory
approaches, that balance both prescriptive as well as principle-based elements
in an SEC rule on climate-related financial disclosures. Evidence tying
climate-related disclosures to SEC mandates, such as investor protection and
capital formation, will be critical. Using these tools, the agency may be better
able to harness rising political and investor enthusiasm for rules on disclosure
and mitigate any remaining business reluctance and judicial hostility to its
regulatory efforts.
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